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ANGLOSAXONY AND ITS TRADITION

ONE ANGLO-AMERICAN NATION

*The Foundation of AngloSaxony as Basis
of World Federation*

A British Response to Streit

*

George Catlin

Introduction by

The Rt. Hon. J. C. Wedgwood, D.S.O., P.C., M.P.

with Preface by

Ernest Barker, D.LITT., LITT.D., LL.D.

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
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Sail on, O Union, strong and great !

TO

F. D. R.

WITH RESPECT



INTRODUCTION

By The Rt. Hon. J. C. WEDGWOOD,

D.S.O., P.C., M.P.,

Late Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

ONE gets exasperated with the planners for "after the war." When will that be? It is all so like counting chickens before they are hatched. It assumes such a lot; even that this war will end like the last one—a wild assumption.

So Professor Catlin brushes aside with kind words problems of European Federal Union, and the reconstruction of the League. We must busy ourselves with holding the fort and winning the war. For that Britain and America must come *together again*. Hitler knows that well enough; and his biggest failure, so far, has been that he has drawn us—Britain and America—closer together than ever before in our history.

God's good English gentleman has gone through the Bankruptcy Court and become human. We have ceased to be superior snobs, self-satisfied, aloof, and a perpetual annoyance to less fortunate nations.

Hitler has given us back our own self-respect. He has given us self-confidence; he has given us iron self-control in danger and a blissful measure of self-sacrifice. As important, he has also given us the respect, the sympathy, and the love of millions throughout the world, and especially of the American people. So Hitler has made it inevitable that

Britain and America should come *together again*, and thus defeat his tyranny.

I say inevitable! Of course if Germany cracked up, this year, next year, as in 1918, we might go back to the dog-fight of Versailles fought out by snarling nationalist statesmen. But a war between two different conceptions of morality does not end so badly or so easily as that. Truces are no use in such a conflict; fear is abiding. Fear drives on Hitler to smother even further victims. Fear drives Britain and America together—to survive.

The natural tendency of all democracies is to decentralize and govern themselves in small units—the smaller the unit the nearer one gets to self-government. But in danger men club together—they must, to survive. Both Britain and America know it. They must get together again to survive—not as two nations, but as free men.

The only question is how, and when?

All through history, confederacies have broken up as danger seemed to vanish. Federal Union has always stood the test. So Professor Catlin and I are for Federal Union, which allows no loophole for dereliction of duty. I think “after the war” will be too late, for the urge will then have vanished and the vested interests of rulers and places raise their conflicting claims.

Go step by step, no doubt; but start now! The first step is common citizenship; the second a common war executive—mixed, here, and in Washington. Thereafter comes a Common Parliament or Senate to advise, criticize, and vote the money for the common cause.

The Federal Union could at all times add to the

number of the United States; just as territories in America have one by one been admitted as self-governing States. This seems to me to be a better way of dealing with Indian Provinces and States or African Colonies than that suggested by Professor Catlin. It would be the natural way to take into the Union any free European State.

Representation in the Parliament or Senate would no doubt depend rather on the contribution to be made to the common fund than on population. I should hope that the Executive would be responsible to the supreme Parliament and that the separation of Executive from the Legislature, as in America, would not be perpetuated. But all this is a matter for conference. The essence is Federal Union, and the sooner the better if we are to win.

While it may safely be said that at least nine-tenths of the people of this island would be in favour of Reunion with America the moment Mr Churchill gave the word, it is certain that the offer must come from America, not from us. We are more dependent on them than they on us; we are in the greater danger.

Therefore the way must be prepared, more particularly in America. Therefore I welcome Professor Catlin's book with its clear statement of the draft Declaration of Federation.

PREFACE

By ERNEST BARKER,
D.LITT., LITT.D., LL.D.,

Late Professor of Political Science in the University
of Cambridge.

IN another existence (or so it seems after the perturbations of a quarter of a century), and in another University, the author of this book and the writer of this foreword were connected as pupil and teacher. It is a close bond, which leaves a lasting link of "natural piety." In memory of that link, and in obedience to that piety, these words are written.

The theme of Professor Catlin's book is the organization—to-day, to-morrow, and for the future—of a system which will hold together the Anglo-Saxon tradition (on which he published a work in 1939) and the general body of AngloSaxondom. It is a theme which engages all our minds to-day, on both sides of the Atlantic. There are two great bearers of the Anglo-Saxon tradition—the people of the United States, and the associated peoples of the British Empire. They are already, as our Prime Minister has said, "somewhat mixed." They are likely to be further mixed. What is to be the scheme or system of their mixture?

There is one sovereign proviso to which any scheme or system is necessarily subject. It must be freely embraced by the deliberate will of both of the bearers of the common tradition. But there

is also another proviso which is no less, or even more, sovereign. Any scheme or system which seeks to regulate the mixture of the American people and the associated peoples of the British Empire must be calculated not for their benefit only, but for the general benefit of all peoples. It must be broad enough, in intention and scope, to be the nucleus of something still broader than itself. AngloSaxondom (if we use that term) is not a race or a stock. It is a language of the mind. It is the language of free institutions and free co-operation. It must be wide enough to embrace *all* who are free and willing to co-operate freely—whatever may be the language of their lips. A “shut” or exclusive Americo-British system would be a contradiction of its own essence.

What ideal of mixture should we then attempt to frame? The answer which we give will depend, in the first instance, on our own prepossessions, based on our own experience of life. If we are Americans, justly enamoured of the benefits of a federal system which has brought a century and a half of life, liberty, and happiness, we shall think of the extension of our federal system (it may be with modifications) to embrace a wider world; and even if we are not Americans, but have had experience of life which inclines to the federal way, we shall tend to think in similar terms. If, on the other hand, we are British, and if we are steeped in the idea (enunciated by the Imperial Conference of 1926) of the free association of autonomous communities, equal in status and in no way subordinate to one another, we shall think of a pattern of union which is at once looser and possibly easier. We

shall think of a mixture of the American people and the associated peoples of the British Empire which is like the mixture already existing in the British Empire—which does not express itself in the black and white of federal institutions, but in the subtler shades of common conventions or understandings. We shall say *Idem velle, idem nolle, in republica, eademum firma amicitia est*; and we shall be content with the firm friendship of common understandings.

These are the answer of the first instance. But we have, in the last resort, to give an answer of the last instance: we have to rise above our prepossessions, and to attain a view of what is best for us both apart from our prepossessions—and not only for both of us, but also for all others who look to us and are likely to be affected, either for weal or woe, by the view we take and the answer we give. What, then, is to be the nature of the answer of the last instance? To find it, if it can be found, we must go back to the original genius and the essential method which is common to the American people and the associated peoples of the British Empire. That original genius, and that essential method, is the genius and the method of tentative experimentation. There are two Latin words (if it be not a folly to define the Anglo-Saxon in Latin terms) which express the character of the Anglo-Saxon tradition of political action. One is the word *interim*, in the sense in which it is used when we speak of an *interim* solution: the other is the word *pedetemptim*, in the sense of feeling the way with a light and tentative step. *Interim et pedetemptim* is no bad motto for statesmen in Washington and London. If they follow that motto, they may

feel that the right way to the answer of the last instance is the way of exploring common understandings and of acting together, in co-operation, on the basis of those understandings. The system (if it be a system) on which the associated peoples of the British Empire co-operate may also be the system which affords the best ground for their further co-operation with the people of the United States, and ultimately with other peoples. The flexible texture of understandings—common understandings—is the natural expression of that language of the mind which is the essence of AngloSaxondom.

CAMBRIDGE,

May 15, 1941.

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I

THE CASE EXPLAINED

FOUR times a night a train leaves Chicago for New York on the Michigan Central route. In its journey the great express crosses Canada for over a hundred miles, stopping at St Thomas and Welland. If he is fortunate the traveller will have my experience. The passport and customs officers come on and pass through the train. "What destination, gentlemen?" "New York." There is no further enquiry. No examination of passports. No examination of baggage. One crosses and recrosses the border.

Here, on the Canadian frontier, the American and Canadian customs officers who patrol the border in search of violations do so in the same airplane. They used to do so in separate ones. It seemed more efficient, economical and rational to use the same airplane. The only real question is why there should be a frontier to patrol at all. The American-Canadian frontier is like the Anglo-Scottish border in this: here is the frontier that almost does not exist. Indeed at times the President of the United States carries on the government of that country from within His Majesty's Dominions, since Mr Roosevelt has his holiday home in New Brunswick.

One object of this book is to suggest that this and other frontiers should cease to exist, not almost, but

entirely. To see a frontier is to see an outrage to humanity. The only real and inevitable frontiers are those drawn when masses of men have sharply different notions about what life should be lived for, and who vividly feel themselves to belong to different communities. There are "they" and "us," each on different sides of the line to the other.

Since the date of this journey of mine through Canada I have had occasion to cross the Atlantic to England. A boat on one particular trip was almost empty, although the earlier boat going out to America had been full to capacity, with the divans in the smoking-rooms used as beds. The earlier boat was filled with German and Czech refugees and returning American citizens. The second boat, a neutral, was empty because international communications had broken down. "It is the war." Later, the boats themselves became rare. The last one I crossed on was torpedoed. With war the world and its civilization breaks into parts—non-intercommunicating parts. With war the frontier becomes uncrossable. The arteries of humanity are ligatured. The frontier comes to be emphasized by a "no man's land," left to kites and crows.

A further object of this book is to suggest, not only that the frontier and "no man's land" be eliminated, but that countries can be fused and their peoples united in some Federation, and first those peoples that are closest together. To describe this Federation we use Henry Clay's old phrase, "Federal Union."

That means—and this is *our third object*—to advocate the federation into a commonwealth, or the federal union, of the English-speaking peoples, to which may well be early added the Scandinavian

and Dutch. Our object is to constitute "One Anglo-American nation." I admit that this may mean American predominance in AngloSaxony. Let those say who care that the argument is that the British Commonwealth joins the United States. Even were it so I should not be dismayed by it. In the cycle of civilizations this can be an Anglo-American Century—and beneficially so if this be a century of new faith also in Lincoln's creed of humanity. The establishment of such a nation can be concurrent with Pan-European Union—to which Britain herself would form the great bridgehead—were this project found feasible. Britain could be, in such a European Union, what the United States is in Pan-American Union.

Such advocacy, indeed, I submit, should be unnecessary except in details. It is Adolf Hitler himself who has written in *Mein Kampf*, where he argues for the advantage to a state of the possession of a concentrated territory:

Even Britain is no proof to the contrary, for we are apt to forget the true nature of the Anglo-Saxon world in its relation to the British Empire. If only on account of her community of language and culture with the American Union, England cannot be compared with any other State in Europe.

Adolf Hitler it is who, by founding the Third Reich, has made the creation of AngloSaxondom inevitable. Madame Tabouis said so in August, 1940; and this was one of those occasions when Madame Tabouis was right.

In the words of Lord Morley, in *On Compromise* (1877): "Our people, whether English or American,

have long ago superseded the barbarous device of dictator or Cæsar by the manly arts of self-government."

When Adolf Hitler sat down to contemplate the position of Germany under the military and economic terms of the Treaty of Versailles, he reflected that the final factors were not those of military and economic defeat, but that 80,000,000 Germans existed with a common culture, capable of immense political power if they could only be prevailed upon to regard themselves as one. *Ein Reich*. 160,000,000 Russians exist in their Soviet Federal Union of diverse peoples, to implement the policy of Sovietism, national and international. And 180,000,000 Anglo-Saxons exist, in terms of common speech, tradition and culture, if they can be prevailed upon to recognize themselves as one.

The third object, then, of this book is to advocate this Foundation of AngloSaxony. By "Anglo-Saxony" is meant, *not* a racial, but a cultural bloc, with common traditions, habits, culture and (by and large) political views. The very core of that culture is a notion, not of race, but of freedom. That bloc is capable of "working" as a unity. *It must be caused to recognize itself as such*. If united, it is the most powerful, wealthiest, most largely populated unit in the world, the best endowed with steel, oil, and (not least) technical skill, decisive in the world's destinies, even against Nazi-ism and Stalinism. It is capable of working for economic justice as for the abolition of war. It controls a quarter of the earth's surface and over a quarter of its population, whereas the Soviet Union controls

only, with all its mixed races, one-sixth.¹ Compared with AngloSaxony the German Reich is and must remain—for ethnographic reasons, if no other—negligible.

* * * * *

The first purpose of the present war is a concrete one: survival. Mr Churchill and Mr Roosevelt have both used the same phrase. It is a matter of the survival of a certain system of government and a certain level of economic life. The second purpose has been stated more vaguely as “to extirpate Hitlerism.”

There is a third purpose that remains to be stated. It was announced more vigorously in connection with the First World War. It was then stated under the phrase: “The war to end war—and make the world safe for democracy.” These purposes still stand and should be kept in mind. Assuredly it is not too early—it may be too late—to consider these things. “Let the People Think.” As Hitler, with irony, himself said, when founding the Palace of Art in Munich in 1934, “This is a glorious world in which to live in which men are confronted with problems.” Let us take up this challenge with vision and courage. In the words of William Pitt, in the days of the Napoleonic Wars, let us “hold out a prospect” to other nations.

As the London *Times* said editorially, in February 1941: “The great twin scourges which have most

¹ For a discussion of the question of India, *vide* p. 70. Perhaps we should subtract from our total the population of India. If so, however, we can almost equally legitimately add, for practical purposes, the 400,000,000 of China, the traditional friend of the United States.

deeply touched the imagination and seared the conscience of the present generation are the scourge of war and the scourge of unemployment." For myself I am an uncompromising War Abolitionist. The question is: How abolish war? The Marxist, the pacifist, Federal Union, Hitlerian Cæsarism offer alternate routes. Hitler offers a peace such as Tacitus described, a compulsory unification based on military force. The assumption is that nothing less can be effective with the nations. We offer a federal New Order over against the Cæsarean New Ordering.

There are some statesmen such as Signor Mussolini who have denied that war can ever be ended. It is against this that we fight, resisting his force by force. Were it true that nothing that had ever been general and customary with humanity could be changed, then, by this reasoning, we should have slavery and even cannibalism still with us.

Human beings will always remain acquisitive and aggressive creatures. But slavery, as a form of social life, has been abolished; and war can be. It is by its nature unjust and the father of lies. Its only heroic justification is the war to put it also under "that has put all things under." Slavery was abolished when white men found a better and more effective way of doing for civilization what slavery had undoubtedly done.

National war will be abolished when the stronger nations can find some other way of securing themselves from aggression by their neighbours. If it is not abolished, then, with technological advance, we shall have with us the state-built-for-war—and

that, as was said long ago, is something basically different to the very drainage from a society of which the normal purpose is peace. If no great stride is taken towards the abolition of war itself at the end of this war, in this tiny globe that Wiley Post went around in eight days, then again we shall be confronted, as in the 'twenties, with the disillusionment of youth. What matters is not the fate of nations but the purpose towards which we aim—world peace, the end of anarchy of the nations, national liberty. It is not yet certain that the stride to organized peace will be taken. It depends upon our resolution. Otherwise, before we die, we shall for a second time hear more about it and our generation's failure.

It may be said with some confidence that the younger people will certainly demand the coming, out of this Second World War, of the conditions of a more enduring peace—an advance to the definite abolition of war and to the securing of liberty. They are distrustful of the methods and promises of plausible statesmen such as were displayed in the First World War—although they tend to forget the more malign influence of megalomaniac pressmen and a suggestible public. Marx-Leninist Communism promises them this perpetual peace on the other side of world civil war. It is an attractive doctrine preached by devoted fanatics as a world-gospel, waiting for the collapse of Western and Central Europe to be preached all over the world. If an alternative gospel is not found, more and more young people will go over to Marxist Communism. The drift is inevitable. The power of Russia is there to aid. Should that power be found

to lead only to confusion in the West, or to be itself stucco, then (lacking a Western faith) there will be an ultimate reaction to local Fascism. Nazi Cæsarism with its would-be restored Roman Empire is only to be met by a democratic Federal New Order, with sovereignty lodged in the federation.

If totalitarianism is centralized—while able to use international organizations to subvert opponents—but democracy and freedom persist in selfish and anachronistic divisions, with multiplicity of sovereign states, then democracy as a political way of life will perish. We have reached the parting of the ways between those who will accept the federal principle and those who prefer the anarchy of multiple sovereignties, the seed-plot of future wars.

Numerous causes have been assigned for war. The Marxists assign dogmatically an economic cause—although what guarantee there ever was that, had Trotsky ruled Socialist Siberia and Stalin ruled Socialist Russia, they would not have fought, I do not know.¹ It is, however, indubitably *one* cause. Since the days of Malthus a biological cause for war has been found in over-population; and to-day we find the Cabinet Information Board (Dr Nobufumi Ito) and the Planning Board of Japan advising an increase of population for that over-populated land—just as Mussolini advised a baby-

¹ Discussion of the economic case for a Western Federal Commonwealth will be found in Chapter III. *Vide*, on exclusive economic causes of war, *The Betrayal of the Left*, by John Strachey and others, p. 124, in criticism of the usual Marxist dogmatism. Also *Democracy and War*, edited by the present writer and E. F. M. Durbin (Kegan Paul).

war for over-populated Italy—"if Japan is to lead in Asia." Others, such as Professor Arnold Toynbee, find a psychological cause for war in the proneness of humanity to die for religions, often false—in popular enthusiasms for the tribal ideal of nationalism. Anyone who will consider Macedonian nationalism, in a land where gunmen are gunmen, will be able to reflect how evil and reactionary this ideal, taken as absolute and by itself, may be. I submit that the basic cause of war lies in the clashing demands for power, including money power, between aggressors and defenders among those who regard each other as alien—"us" and "them." The explanation is to be found in the Power Theory of Politics. Men are led to fight for the power of their group or its defence.

It is this that has to be bridged—the gap between "us" and "them." It must be done in terms of wider community and that community's law. War will be ended when power is lodged "determinately" (as Austin would have said) in that wider community. Federal Union at least of the English-speaking—and perhaps the Scandinavian—peoples can be achieved because there are human beings on both sides of the border, not animals of a different species. Incidentally, British diplomats habitually say "you" where Mr Winant, more courteously, more far-seeing, and more profoundly, says "we." There is no reason, save in growling over the gnawed bones of ancient prejudices, why these peoples, with the loves and pleasures that are the common lot *and who share so much of a common way of life*, should not be united. Goethe saw this tendency long ago when he contrasted the peaceful ritual

of the seasons, the human pleasures, the true core of civilization in humane ways, with the ambitions and fierce warfares, the superficial bloody aims of the princes and the politicians. The freedom to be fought for is the freedom to live in one's own way as a moral being of free choice, not the freedom to see leaders build, as did the kings of old in Ashantee, each a larger, whiter heap of skulls than his rival. As the philosopher Kant said as long ago as 1795:

The problem of the formation of the federal state, hard as it may sound, is not insoluble, even for a race of devils, if intelligent.

And, before Kant, Leibniz and many another, since Aeschines the Greek, had said the same.

The League of Nations, whose defects we shall discuss later, provided a first tentative step—and a long one—towards organizing the abolition of war as an instrument of national policy. The trouble was that the League itself was the weak instrument of a group of nations who still regarded themselves as entire sovereign powers. Their emissaries owed a prior obligation, before that to the League, to the sovereign interests of their several countries.

After this war, the League will be retained if the Western Allies win. There must be a clear pledge to do this. But the major political strains will have to rest upon *more limited* political organizations of which the constituent nations are prepared, in a commonwealth or federal union, to sacrifice their individual sovereignties to the common control.

Those political and social organizations must be

built up, first, where the emotions and cultural prejudices of peoples make it most likely that they will take lasting root. Human organizations cannot be built out of abstract principles and patched-together documents. The American Confederation of 1777, despite all its weakness, was not of that nature.

* * * * *

For seventeen years I have urged at intervals, in articles and books, that the United States and the British Commonwealth should reunite, along with other nations, on grounds economic, cultural, and of common defence—and not least in order that the Anglo-Saxon peoples should assume that rôle of responsibility which they owed to their neighbours and themselves and for which their divisions provided a fatal alibi. They held the major position of power in the world and declined to consolidate it, when the crying demand in the world was for the Consolidation of Power.

At that time no one was interested. The plan was in accordance with the idea of Cecil Rhodes. However, it pleased British imperialists no more than it pleased American isolationists or enthusiasts for a universal League—which League, however, for the most part did not include the United States, Russia, or Germany, and which had to begin by asking the Ambassadors' Conference to placate Italy. There was no focus of power until Germany provided one *against* the Anglo-Saxon powers and *against* the League. France made the attempt at the expense of the League, which was used as the instrument, but had not the necessary breadth of basis to carry through the work.

What I have here written is, then, no eleventh-hour discovery. As long ago as 1925 I wrote on the thesis of Anglo-Saxon union for the American Press. Later, in my *Principles of Politics* (1931), I developed the theme that the concentration of power was the guarantee of the effective organization of peace, while pointing out that a cloud was rising in the skies, "the size of a man's hand." The organization of "AngloSaxony" or "AngloSaxondom" was advocated in my *Preface to Action* (1934) and, again, in my contribution to the symposium *Challenge to Death* (1934). In 1939 I was invited to deliver in Washington, during the spring, a series of lectures on this theme, subsequently published as *AngloSaxony and its Tradition* (1939). While in Washington I had the good fortune to come across and review, for the *Washington Post*, Mr Clarence Streit's *Union Now*, advocating the union of fifteen democracies, and, later, to meet Mr Streit and his associates. The previous autumn a British Federalist movement had begun, which however was—and is—almost exclusively pre-occupied with European Federal Union, despite the broader views of Mr Lionel Curtis and of Lord Lothian, with whom I had the opportunity of frequent discussions. The present book is the fruit of reflections due to a lecture tour across Canada, speaking on Federal Union, in January, 1940, to members of the Canadian Institutes of International Affairs, Canadian Clubs and Chambers of Commerce, and was in part delivered in a Convocation address and in lecture-form by courtesy of the University of Kansas City in the same year.

I first drafted these pages six months before

Mr Churchill's offer of Federal Union to France and as long before Mr Streit started his campaign for Anglo-American Union; seven months before Dr Schacht started to talk of regional blocs; and eight months before Mr Churchill talked of "Anglo-Saxondom" and before the Ogdensburg meeting of President Roosevelt and Mr Mackenzie King, Premier of Canada. However, ten years ago Mr Winston Churchill, in his *If it had Happened Otherwise*, wrote of the possible signing of a Covenant between the British Empire and the United States, "the most beneficent covenant of which human records are witness."

Before anyone dismisses this plan as Utopian nonsense, I would wish him to consider the following passage that occurs in Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's recent *Europe Must Unite* (1939-40):

Six hundred years ago it seemed Utopian to wish to liberate the peasants of Switzerland from the power of the Hapsburgs and unite them in a Republic.

Five hundred years ago the unification of France seemed Utopian, as did the unification of Spain and the expulsion of the Moors from Europe.

Four hundred years ago the unification of England and Scotland in Great Britain seemed Utopian.

Three hundred years ago the liberation of Hungary from Turkish domination seemed Utopian.

Two hundred years ago the restoration of Greece seemed Utopian.

One hundred years ago the national unification of Germans and Italians seemed Utopian.

Fifty years ago the unification and restoration of Poland, Roumania and Jugoslavia seemed Utopian.

I would add that, thirty years ago, Wilson's League of Nations would have seemed laughably

Utopian and von Moltke's remark (substantially reiterated by Nietzsche and Mussolini) far more sensible: "Perpetual peace is a dream and not even a beautiful dream."

We live in an age when Lenin, Mussolini, and Hitler, not to speak of Kemal Ataturk, have all achieved the impossible, although not always the Utopian. The impossible lies all about us—accomplished. It is the idea that stands out before all as real. Mr Prudent Commonsense is on the dole. It is time for the democracies to wake up, look around them, and discover an idea to guide them.

The opposition that claims Federal Union to be impossible arises, it may be suspected, among those who would be the last to like it were it found to be practicable, especially in Communist quarters where—for very good and astute reasons indeed—there is deadly opposition to a scheme that is, in width of vision for youth, a serious rival, such as any plans to put back the world of 1919 can never be.

* * * * *

*The specific proposal in this book is that the British Commonwealth and the United States shall unite. For those who believe that the old world of sovereign states, the breeding nest of wars, must be thrown into the discard, the plain duty is to begin with the most artificial frontier—to carry through the simplest *Anschluss* first. Here is the guarantee that, when we talk so much about peace and collective security, we also mean it. There is no reason to suppose that objection to this proposal will come from the United States. One object of this book is to show*

that, were the proposal properly presented, objection would not come from the New World. We want the North American *Anschluss* now.

Further, the specific plan is that France and Britain should also unite in a federal union, so soon as this is feasible. The North American Union should be carried through along with the Anglo-French Union and *pari passu* with it, by mutual agreement. Those who object to Canadian-American Union as fantastic must decide whether they also object to Anglo-French Union as fantastic. We have the word of such an authority on constitutional law as Dr Ivor Jennings for stating, if this reassurance is required by anybody, that these schemes for Federal Union will not interfere with the position of the monarchy.

For the moment, however, this section of the plan—although the one that, until recently, progressed most rapidly—must necessarily remain in abeyance. It is anyhow of secondary and contingent importance compared with Anglo-Saxon unification. It rests on the assumption that the Rhine, rather than the Channel, is the desirable strategic frontier. The issue rather is whether the frontier may not be the Atlantic rather than the Channel, or whether the airplane which eliminates tactically the one must not also eliminate the other.

Also, the specific plan is that the British Commonwealth that links Britain, Ireland, Canada, Australia and the rest of the Dominions shall not dissolve but shall be augmented. The lax relation that binds Britain, Ireland, and Canada will be replaced by one that binds Britain, Ireland, and North America. Whether or not we include Iceland and possibly the other Scandinavian countries — even, in the extreme

instance, Germany herself—is a matter for subsequent discussion. So also is the position of the Colonies, whether in the Federation or under some international Geneva control.

Last, the specific plan is that this whole organized region shall, if possible, take its place within a loose confederation of world extension, centred at Geneva, within which other federated regions can also have their place and proper function in the regulation of the territory of the globe for peace. The function of Geneva will be to prevent "bigger and better wars"—although, be it noted, our present wars are now regional wars, if our peaces are still national peaces—by holding the whole together.

Nationalism, certainly not as cultural autonomy, but as "sovereign state-ism," is as dead as the Nineteenth Century and *laissez-faire*. We must recognize that fact. Federalism provides the legitimate liberty for the nation as democracy provides it for the individual. Liberty, democracy, and federalism are intrinsically connected principles.

A humble illustration may be used, which I adopted in discussing this matter on board ship with Mr Vincent Sheehan. Let us take from our pocket some coins. Here are two American "quarters." Let them represent the large areas of Canada and the United States. Let them be put near each other. Then we take two dimes. These smaller coins will stand for Britain and France. One dime, Britain, touches one "quarter," Canada. Now let us find a nickel or cent. Let that be Germany. Then let us take a lump of melting ice. That is Stalin. Let us put the lump down beyond Germany. Now we draw the lump, Stalin,

and the nickel, Germany, together. When we do so we also draw the two dimes together. That is the necessary political rejoinder—the next move in the game. But let us now do the same with the two “quarters.” Since the one “quarter,” Canada, and the one dime, Britain, began by touching, all four pieces are drawn together, although the United States and France need not touch. And, *ecco!* so our Western Union is constituted.

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Another illustration serves to clarify both what we are seeking to accomplish and why we believe that it can be accomplished. Let us look at the map of the world—not at a map of the Eastern Hemisphere that has Westminster and the longitude of Greenwich near its centre, but at a map of the world that puts the Western Hemisphere in the centre and, let us say, the longitude of Winnipeg. And let us colour the British Commonwealth, as usual, red. Let us colour the United States orange.

We shall then see that the Commonwealth falls into the shape of a crescent moon, having one tip of its horn in Australia and another in South Africa. The waist of it is Canada. The British African colonies lie on the Eastern horn. And, incidentally, Britain and Ireland (not to speak of France) lie on the North-Eastern periphery, as outposts against Europe or Eurasia. This map gives us new perspectives, not only geographical, but political.

This crescent moon lies round the north of that orange full-moon which is the United States, with the horns of the crescent pointing south and embracing the full-moon—the situation called by star-gazers, “the new moon with the old lying in

its arms." Strategy and politics to-day are revolutionized by air-transport. And, as we look at the lines of transport and communication, we note that the life-line of communication for the British runs through the Panama Canal rather than the Suez Canal, if we take the perspective of the Commonwealth and of the British-outside-Europe, as I do here, rather than of Westminster. The great central bloc of population is the United States, where New York is nearer to London than to San Francisco. As to area, if we fold Canada back over its frontier line, then it will entirely overlap the United States and its outlying parts will stretch to Venezuela.

Viewed in this way the whole area shouts the possibilities of organization as one coherent system, with the "Old Dominion" in the centre and the Commonwealth encircling, as outer fringe, the Republic. The whole makes a natural region. That region is AngloSaxondom.

* * * * *

If the broader view is taken of Western Union, so that North American Federation in the widest sense went on *pari passu* with Anglo-French integration while not breaking the light transatlantic association of the Commonwealth, then a power would be built up compared with which Herr Hitler's Reich—and indeed anything an undivided Germany alone could do—would appear trifling.

The first steps can be taken by the United States and Canada inside North America, working on the precedents of the North American International Waterways Commission and of the United States Interstate Commerce Commission, not to speak of

paper schemes such as those provided by Streit and Jennings. Those first steps are here and now advocated. Those first steps are in fact being taken in the shape of the work of the North American Permanent Joint Defence Board. Simultaneously, common organizations may be developed between Britain and Free France. It would be an irony of history, catastrophic for Canada, if—when Britain and France might be coming together—United States' isolationist philosophy took revenge on itself by provoking, in intent, a local Canadian isolationism, on the defensive against both Europe and the United States. I believe that this Western Union may be possible—may crystallize or “jell”—thanks precisely to the political menace of Hitler himself.

We are not yet in a position to provide blueprints of the post-War territorial arrangement of the world or of its political order. It is dubious how far it is useful to discuss in detail the constitution of a body which does not yet exist and of which we are not yet even sure of the members. There is, however, a case for initiating a federal movement to secure peace, to the end that those who accept the principles of this movement shall declare themselves and shall decide with whom they wish to associate. The Declaration of Federation at the end of this book rehearses those principles.

Any man must be an inexperienced optimist who imagines that Federal Union in any area at all will be achieved without arousing strong opposition, deliberate misunderstanding, and violent passions. The Federal Union movement, if it is to achieve its ends and is not to be piously “sold out,” will doubtless pass through the three customary stages from

being ridiculed as impossible, on to being denounced as immoral, and then be acclaimed as something that the opponents themselves thought of long ago.

It is, for example, a challenge to the United States of America to decide whether it does or does not wish to associate itself in a project for what, at least, will be a Greater America and, at best, so much more, and for the organization of the Atlantic world. Or does the United States wish to see parts of America drawn into a federated Europe, or, alternatively, a Eurasian bloc built up, constructed in the triangle Berlin-Moscow-Rome, or the quadrilateral Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo-Rome, dominating the Atlantic, confronting America across the ocean and extending its fingers towards South America?

II

WHAT WE WANT

"WHEN the capital of the British Commonwealth shifts at all, it will shift either west to Washington or east to Moscow."

So wrote Mr Bernard Shaw in *The Apple Cart* (1929). An idea is not necessarily wrong because Mr Shaw suggests it. Mr Shaw, indeed, ingeniously hints that it is the Irish who, for their own good ends, will bring this union of the United States and the British Commonwealth about. (It does not, as we shall show, follow that the capital must be only Washington.)

Federation is, of course, no very new idea. Apart from old Kant's argument, which I have quoted, to the effect that the next stage in the world's political development beyond the State must be the Federation, Cecil Rhodes' whole life was devoted to the notion of an Anglo-Saxon federation of nations.

Further, on the continent of Europe, since the First World War, we have had the Austrian diplomat, Count Richard Coudenhove - Kalergi, urging a United States of Europe in *Pan-Europa* and other books. He and Dr Lange of Norway occupied much of the 1920's discussing just what shape this union should take. M. Aristide Briand and M. Herriot, both premiers of France, contributed speeches and books on the subject. Señor de Madariaga had a *World's Design*. Nor did

Mr H.G. Wells fall far short of bringing the entire planetary system into line, with a world state for our local planet. Nothing less would satisfy him.

Mr Lionel Curtis, in the direct succession of Rhodes and associated with the *Round Table* group, in his three volumes *Civitas Dei* (1934-37) brought us back again to the notion of federation in the Anglo-Saxon world. President Aydelotte developed the idea. Mr Clarence Streit, Geneva correspondent of the *New York Times*, set out to federate fifteen democracies, as explained in his *Union Now* (1937-38). As I have said, the present writer has been using the idea of AngloSaxondom since 1925 and the words since 1934.

In November, 1939, Lord Lothian, late British Ambassador in Washington, and also a member of the *Round Table* group, said: "Some form of federation . . . at any rate for part of Europe, is a necessary condition of any stable world order." He added an admirable pamphlet, advocating Federation, called *The End of Armageddon*. In the same month Mr Attlee, M.P., leader of the British Labour Party, said: "There must be a recognition of an international authority superior to the individual states . . . Europe must federate or perish." M. Léon Blum, late Premier of France, was no less emphatic. Sir Archibald Sinclair, leader of the British Liberal Party, has said: "The principle of federation supplies an obvious line of approach." Mr Arthur Greenwood says: "In our view a lasting peace is obtainable only by the establishment of a commonwealth of states, whose collective authority shall transcend, in its proper sphere, the sovereign rights of individual nations." To the views of

two other members of the British War Cabinet, and those not the least important—Mr Churchill and Lord Beaverbrook—we shall have occasion to refer later.¹ We shall also have occasion to refer to Mr Wendell Willkie. Speaking in April 1941, to the Pan-American Union on Pan-America Day, Mr Henry Wallace, Vice-President of the United States, said: "Some day I hope there will be a Pan-Europe Day."

Speaking in February, 1941, Mr Harold Nicolson, M.P., Parliamentary Private Secretary of the British Minister of Information, said: "In our new order there will be no slave States. There will be a community of free peoples, each working out its own problems. And above that will be a union of peoples, each one of whom will sacrifice something of its political and economic independence for the good and for the defence of the community." Earlier, in 1940, Mr Duff Cooper, Minister of Information, said: "We must start with certain selected democratic Powers . . . it is better to start with a group that is too small than with one that is too large for effective action." Federation by stages *allows for historical development*. I vividly recall Mrs Roosevelt saying, at a White House luncheon, to the writer: "Federal Union is one of the few creative ideas that has emerged since the war." All that matters is that we should not permit attachment to regionalism to obscure the reality of the moral demand to advance the world a step further towards some world design in political organization. We must be sure that we lay the right foundations for "a new order."

¹ *Vide* pp. 40, 44, 82, 146.

Along with the speech-makings march the facts. It will be noted that most of the speeches by British and French statesmen obviously look especially to the establishment of some species of United States of Europe or, at least, in Europe.

That line reached at once its historical culmination and some kind of temporary full-stop in Mr Winston Churchill's astounding and revolutionary offer to France—it is said, suggested from France—made in June, 1940, and rejected by thirteen to eight votes, of Federal Union, including a united parliament.

In the Western Hemisphere, however, the march goes uninterruptedly on. Incredible things are happening before our eyes. The new order arises.

In the Bermudas the American flag already flies. Since the decisive meeting, in September, 1940, between President Roosevelt and Mr Mackenzie King, at Ogdensburg, N.Y., a Joint Permanent Board of Defence, of the United States and Canada, has been set up under dual Canadian and American chairmanship, the American Chairman being the well-known Mayor of New York, Mr La Guardia. The British and American commonwealths have, as Mr Churchill said in the House of Commons, become confused like the tumbled waters of Mississippi and Missouri, and the joint flood "goes rolling along." AngloSaxondom has been born—born as an actual, dynamic, and unprecedented power, with equivalent responsibilities.

The American aerial and naval bases are now in the British West Indies. The American marines are now in Newfoundland. Adolf Hitler had the genius to allow for these possibilities. It was one

reason why he was not anxious for war with the Anglo-Saxon West, and said so in *Mein Kampf*.

It is not indeed all something entirely new. In Article XI of the founding Articles of Confederation of the United States of 1777 it is written: "Canada acceding to this confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union: but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States."

The American Founding Fathers may have had their own good reason for that clause, just as there is doubtless good reason for having a vacant chair for Canada available at the Pan-American Conference. Whether the offer is good or bad depends upon the total relations of the British Commonwealth and the United States, the Eastern and the Western portions of the Anglo-Saxon world. The stirring up of bad relations between them is the patent task of the enemies of both. Already (*London Times*, May 6, 1941) the *Kölnische Zeitung* is signalling alarm over the development of AngloSaxony and the *Stettiner General-Anzeiger* is endeavouring to sabotage it by appealing to British jealousy—the jealousy of the Eastern against the Western half.

So far as I am aware in law the Articles of Confederation are repealed only to the extent to which they are superseded by the Constitution of the United States. That an application for the elimination of the Canadian-American frontier would anyhow receive highly privileged treatment from the Senate of the United States scarcely needs discussion.

It is probably the most pointless frontier in the

world, political, cultural, and economic, and the most easily eliminated. Men of British Columbia have probably more in common with men of Oregon than they have with men of Quebec. The same is true of the inhabitants of the Prairie Provinces on both sides of the line. The union of forty-eight States and nine provinces might well be easier to "put over"—were that all there was to it—than the union of the United States and Canada. There is nothing sacred in the number forty-eight. But there is more to it than that. . . . Canada, although it emphasizes that it is a North American country, is also part of the British Commonwealth.

Here is Mr Wendell Willkie, late Presidential candidate of the United States and probably future Presidential candidate—the man who more than any other swung the Republican Party over to interventionism—saying, on February 2, 1940, that he wants to see made, and plans to introduce to the American people, the following proposals:

1. An economic and social union of the United States and the British Empire, which in effect will constitute a bond of brotherhood linking the English-speaking peoples of the world.

2. The abolition of all immigration barriers between countries comprising the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States, giving to holders of American passports in any part of the British Empire and of British passports in the United States the full value of citizenship.

The question is, how much of this scheme, together with Mr Willkie's additional projects for stabilizing the dollar-sterling exchange and free industrial, educational, and research interchanges of

personnel, can be carried through *during this war*. If it is not carried well forward during the war, it is very unlikely that it will be carried through during the "swing back to normalcy" afterwards or during the social revolutionary situation that, in turn, is likely to succeed this hoped-for normalcy. We must build this "economic and social union of the United States and the British Empire." We must found AngloSaxondom as an indissoluble unity.

* * * * *

Why do I use the word "AngloSaxony" or "AngloSaxondom"? I have been criticized for it by a reviewer in the *Toronto Globe* on the grounds that it must needs give umbrage to all Scots and Irish and Welsh who will not readily forget that this civilization would have achieved no distinction had not the heavy Teutonic Saxon mass been infused with the Celtic vision and genius. Humbly I confess my fault and put on record that I am well aware that the English-speaking world is governed by the Scots. I also submit that a quarrel on terms is pedantic, academic, unimaginative, and obstructive.

First, I use the term because the person who earliest—if quite casually—used the term "Anglo-Saxony" was a Welshman, Mr Wyndham Lewis. In these matters I am prepared to do whatever a Celt and a Welshman will do. Even the idea, which others had earlier, was given resonant publicity by an octogenarian Irishman, Mr Shaw, who is always busy stealing John Bull's clothes, while John is bathing, and turning them inside out to patch his Irish wit.

Secondly, Mr Churchill used the word "Anglo-Saxondom" in his House of Commons speech in August, 1940; and what is good enough for the Prime Minister is good enough for me.

Thirdly, I use the term because only the English and the Americans are squeamish about the word. In its adjectival form it is habitually used by eminent Frenchmen such as André Siegfried; by Adolf Hitler; by Lenin. It is only in America that it is thought to be connected with the four hundred best families in Boston, and in England with bones of old kings mixed up together in chests in Winchester Cathedral and with savages running around in linen trousers and dyed in blue woad, or to that effect.

Words such as "English-speaking peoples" are weak, philological, and anæmic. Hesitation, unshared by Messrs Hitler and Lenin, about using the word "Anglo-Saxon" corresponds with hesitation about using the fact — which hesitation is precisely what I am fighting.

I must plead in extenuation that I shall happily adopt another word if anyone will supply me with a better. If anyone believes that a more passionate plea could be registered on a public platform for Anglo-Celto-Saxony, I shall be happy to make it. It would be possible to use the placating, hyphenated phrase "Anglo-America"—with its implication that the "Anglo" is outside America. I certainly did not intend to offend, since this AngloSaxony always included in my mind the Irish, uniting them on both sides of the Atlantic, the French of Quebec, the Dutch of South Africa. It did not indeed go so far as Cecil Rhodes and include the Germans

and Old Saxons. Not that it seems to me that these names matter much so long as we know to what actual thing or relation we are referring.

The Soviet Union has the slogan of Marxism and Class-War. The German Reich has the slogan of Nazi-ism and Race. AngloSaxondom has the slogan of a tradition of Liberty. AngloSaxondom is not cemented by a Class or by a Master-Race, but by a distinctive Tradition.

That tradition is not a matter of opinion but of the historical record. It needs not to be played down but to be emphasized. As a matter of historical fact it has played—as nothing else to be described either as British or as American played—the dominant cultural rôle in English-speaking regions for the last three centuries, from Francis Bacon and Milton to Edison and John Dewey.

The Americans of the United States are a mixed people. The American nation is not a nation in the sense of the French or Germans. The Americans, like the British, are a composite of many races. Any racialism can only serve to disrupt their states and break them up. Fundamentally for them racialism is a subversive and treasonous doctrine. Faith in AngloSaxony, therefore, is essentially not to be construed as a racial or exclusive doctrine or as an imperialist doctrine.

The English, Scots, Jews, Welsh, Irish, Danish, Manx of the British Isles are a very mixed race, Celtic and Teutonic and Semitic—no more Anglo-Saxon in the lump than the Swedes of Wisconsin, the French of Louisiana, the Irish of Boston, and the Jews of the Bronx. (The American usually first sees the British flag in French-speaking

Quebec.) Again, there are the negroes from Nigeria as well as the negroes from Alabama. There is a Great Black British Empire.

All are held together from breaking into several parts — Cymric - speaking Welsh nationalists or Virginians—by this uniting tradition. Apart from it, Great Britain itself would break up into three or more parts, with separate languages and religions.

This Tradition and Culture unite and tie in the French of Quebec and the Dutch of South Africa. They tie in the immigrant Norwegian and Finn and Jew in the United States. This Tradition moulds the negro of the South. It is not Race, but something more spiritual. The time has gone by for clinging fondly to the Anglo-Saxon equivalents of the distinctions between Austrians and Bavarians and Saxons. It is obstructionism.

I found no difficulty in making Norwegians and Dutch understand this point of view. If they wish to join the British Commonwealth they will bluntly say so, however much it may scare nineteenth-century Liberals whose minds are frightened by any concentration of power, and however much it may alarm twentieth-century Communists whose minds are terrified by any concentration of power not in Moscow. The ordinary Norwegian and Dutchman even prefers the solidity of such a structure and the tough texture of such a culture to appeals made on behalf of isolated ideological words such as "democracy," taken as sole formal tests, which mean a different thing in Moscow and Canberra and in China and Peru. "Too ideological" is the phrase I hear: too destitute of historical content and richness.

When we speak of AngloSaxony we refer to the peoples held together by a common *tradition*, the tradition of Milton and Cromwell, Jefferson and Lincoln, as well as by common speech and civilization. Indeed the common culture supposes this common historical tradition—which is only a little narrower, a little more distinctively liberal in experiment, than the tradition of Western civilization itself.

I have already sought to demonstrate that *men are held together in communities by common civilization, by their common values, perspectives in life, homogeneous assumptions about ways of living and political axioms*—so that when one goes tiger-hunting with some of one's associates one has some confidence that the man will not disappear when the tiger appears. *Here is the only likely basis for intimate and lasting federation, involving common citizenship.*

The weakness of the Geneva League, as I have said, is that it stretched the bond of community too thin. The Frenchman did not feel enough genuine community of sympathy with the Ethiopian so that he was one of "us." For all that the Frenchman had signed on the dotted line of Geneva, he would not in fact go to war for the Ethiopian. It is within the areas of common culture that we may expect, as reliable, common conduct. Our work is to integrate politically these areas, within some loose world-wide framework. *Of such areas North America, with the British Commonwealth, is one.*

What are the notes of this tradition? First, Experiment and belief in "an open world," as John Dewey calls it. That involves a certain notion of truth. Then, Liberty—not just "abstract liberty" but liberty not to starve, the right to a job, liberty to

experiment with things and with the expression of one's own personality. Then, Toleration, which connects on with the old Humanism of the Grand Tradition of the West. Then, Democracy—not limitless majority rights at all, or Rousseau's theories, but natural rights, as Locke and Jefferson said, for each common man and respect for common men as entitled to enjoy them under rational natural law: the political right to hire and fire our rulers and the view of the State as the imperfect tool of Man. Parliamentary institutions connect with this notion of democracy, just as the spirit of the Common Law connects with this notion of liberty. Then, Federation—intimately connected with all that has gone before—as the recognition of the same inherent right to autonomous expression and self-determination in the culture of nations and groups as democracy allows to the rights of individuals.

That is the Anglo-Saxon Tradition. Each point can be exemplified by some outstanding figure from some other country. But not all together and for over three centuries. . . . With that tradition corresponds a certain vast territorial area that is controlled by its culture—just as the Soviet Union corporeally bodies forth the Marxist idea of living and the Greater Reich the Nazi idea. Ideas to-day take to themselves flesh. It is high time that, in the case of AngloSaxony, this process was more conscious. *But it should be done with a view to giving a lead towards Federal Union of all democratic nations*, as varied as the nations that make up the populations of the British Isles and, as Mr Roosevelt has said, the United States themselves. There is its moral justification. Here are the

practical steps towards what, as distinct from domestic economic socialism, we may call the Sociality of Nations — the stages towards the formation of what Graham Wallas called “the Great Society.”

This, then, is the Anglo-Saxon Tradition; and this is AngloSaxondom or AngloSaxony. There is no shade of reason for being apologetic about talking of the foundation of the Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth.

* * * * *

What just, however, is this Anglo-Saxon Federation to include? Certainly the United States and Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, and New Zealand. No one doubts that it is practicable for that to be achieved. And the argument has been put forward that we should and must include Ireland and Great Britain and South Africa and, provisionally, the African Colonies. There is also the issue of Latin America. The Federal Union will eliminate frontiers, abolish wars, provide common citizenship, and maintain peace at least within these areas.

First let us consider this situation so far as it affects the English-speaking world in the Western Hemisphere—the United States and the Dominions. As a practical matter Mr Willkie’s proposals, already quoted, have in mind certain relations of British subjects and citizens of the United States. Further, it is perhaps well that the British on the European side of the water should know how the British on the other side of the water—and the Americans of what was once, in Virginia, “the Old Dominion”—are likely to look at the proposition of Federal Union. They are not “just colonials.”

American Isolationism—which is a permanent political factor — is nevertheless “hemispheric.” Jefferson, in his original letter to President Monroe which issued in the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine—a political doctrine built up behind the defences of the British Navy—spoke of this doctrine as a means “of preserving peace in at least one hemisphere.” That peace was to be *throughout one hemisphere* was taken by Jefferson and Monroe as axiomatic and was complementary to the policy of Canning. Speaking at Kingston, Ontario, on Canadian ground, on August 18, 1938, Mr Roosevelt said: “I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire.” What happens in Canada can never be a matter of unimportance to the foreign policy of the United States—or what happens in South America.

It is necessary also to make clear that Federal Union is *not an alternative to Pan-American Union, any more than to the League of Nations, but supplements it.* With a federation of the English-speaking peoples effected, existing tensions in South America would be removed which weaken resistance to Nazi penetration there. The City of London and New York would cease to fight out a suicidal fight in the Argentine. Whether Clarence Streit was right in omitting South America from his fifteen democracies I do not know, but certainly no Federal Union policy is likely to be successful that antagonizes Pan-Americanism any more than one that antagonizes the League of Nations. However, fusion between the United States and, *e.g.*, Australia

would probably go further than fusion with Ecuador or Peru.

The key to *Canadian policy* lies in the need to reconcile sentimental and traditional ties of attachment which run from east to west with economic and cultural interests which connect north and south. Any solution which can reconcile these two factors is likely to commend itself to Canadians. When all allowance is made for the position of Britain as major purchaser of Canadian agricultural produce, it remains substantially true that in Canada the economic lines run north-south, although the political lines run east-west along the routes of railroad transportation.

Canada at the present time is searching for some kind of distinctive policy that shall be specifically Canadian. She has outgrown mere acquiescence in the policy of others—save so far as her politicians may find this a convenient way of eluding responsibility for underwriting obligations they do not feel fully to be theirs. All this has been very fully said by Mr John MacCormac in *Canada: America's Problem* (1940).

One obvious policy would be that of a Canadian nationalism comparable, let us say, to Dutch nationalism. It is often discussed in Canada. It is, I believe, profoundly true that no nation makes her full contribution in the community of nations or behaves in a fashion really of most value to the rest unless she develops and matures her own autonomous culture and spiritual life. That was the teaching of that great nationalist who was also a great internationalist, Mazzini. It is a sound doctrine. It does *not*, however, follow that such

full cultural autonomy is the same thing as a stress on political sovereignty and self-sufficiency or the expression of some kind of belligerent Balkan notion of nationality. All movements towards the Balkanization of the world are retrograde. I believe that forward-looking men fix their eyes on a time when there will be nowhere in the world such things as full sovereign states, but when all sovereignty of states—unless it were a World State—will be mitigated by mutual federal obligations.

Another policy for Canada—supported, just before the war, in certain influential Middle Western quarters in Canada, rightly distrustful of imperialism and colonialism as attitudes of mind—regards the British Commonwealth as in effect very near to dead; the reality as being Canadian nationalism; but the roughness of this localism as needing to be softened by moral adhesion to the League of Nations and to Liberal schemes for international economic organization. This view is sometimes, although not always, distinguished from North Americanism. It is then coupled with a fairly profound pessimism about any advance in American-Canadian relations to a new constitutional plan on the ground that the United States has departed into heresy by not sponsoring the Geneva League. There seem to me to be three major objections to this policy. It is too optimistic about Geneva; it is too pessimistic about the British Commonwealth; and it has not even the merits of a North American policy.

There remain as deserving notice the policies of "British Imperialism"; of North Americanism; and of collaboration as an American nation in the British Commonwealth—of which only the last two

receive to-day any body of popular support. That Canadians do regard themselves as North American can be well illustrated by an experience of my own. When I recently crossed the Canadian border, coming from the south, and the train had been running into Canada for some time, a Canadian customs official asked me: "How long have you been in this country?" "About an hour." "I meant how long have you been in America?" The turn of phrase is a common enough one in Canada. "This country" means the North American area which is thought of as a unity. Much has changed in Canada, as those know who repeatedly visit it, in the last ten years.

It is significant that many of the trade unions ignore the international frontier and include both the United States and Canada. The union symbol is backed, on the badges, by the intertwined British and American flags.

It is, moreover, vital to note that we have got to *go forward* in the intermingling of peoples and the abolition of the frontier *unless we are to go back*. Within five years after the Peace there will assuredly be jealousies, recriminations, and quarrels about American marines in Newfoundland and American aerial and naval bases in Trinidad and elsewhere—unless a decisive policy of vision is well on the road to being implemented. As the United States is likely to remain the pivot in the relation of the Americas, Canada could be pivot in the relation of the Americas with AngloSaxony outside the New World, in the Atlantic and the Pacific.

When we turn to *Australia and New Zealand*, the essential relevant fact is that even an America that

is solely concerned in the interests of America cannot disinterest itself in the strategy of the Pacific. A co-ordination of British Commonwealth interests, not excluding the Dutch, is already taking place in the Delhi Conference of the Eastern Group. But the naval power upon which Australia must ultimately rely, when Britain is attacked, to supplement her own defence, is that of the "sister democracy" of the United States and of its Pacific Fleet. That is a fact fully appreciated in Australia and is welcomed. This is shown, *e.g.*, in an interesting article by Professor A. H. Charteris, of Sydney, in the *New Commonwealth Quarterly* (April, 1940). (The author, however, seems to me to rely too much upon arrangements that may be made after war is declared.) The similarity of American and Australian civilization and way of life scarcely needs to be emphasized.

The happiest solution of the problem of the Pacific and of Far-Eastern Relations would be the joint occupancy by the British and American navies—or (as it might have been, a year ago) by the British, American, Dutch, and French navies—of Singapore and Hawaii. The defence of Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines cannot readily be separated from the defence of Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji. The whole should be carried out in consultation with the effective government in due course of China. That solution seems to me not only happy but entirely feasible. Incidentally the true "route to Australia" lies rather through the Panama Canal than through the Straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. Were, of course, North Atlantic union also regarded as

feasible, then this joint occupancy of Singapore and joint defence of the Pacific would become a matter of course.

South Africa and the African colonies, on the other horn of the crescent moon, are in a somewhat different position. Until recently it might well have been thought that no direct American strategic interest is involved. Now, however, Americans are beginning to talk about the "Straits of Dakar," and to appreciate the strategic significance of the African-S. American crossing. On the other hand, the dependence of the Union of South Africa on outside help, in case of attack by any major Power, is clear enough. The American national interest may be obscure; the South African is not. And did the Netherlands come in to the Federal Union, the South African situation would be still further simplified.

As touching colonial Africa, I was recently travelling in a train with an eminent Canadian exponent of unadulterated North Americanism. I asked him about the Pacific and he told me he "had a plan" for Australia. I then asked him about Africa. Africa he was inclined to dismiss as beyond the Western pale. But unless the United States came into the League, and a much stronger League, I saw little immediate prospect of direct Geneva rule in colonial Africa. Some *interim* solution is necessary. That being the case, I asked my fellow-traveller, was not a policy of "loose from Europe," which left the whole of these vast African colonies to the Europeans for development, and specifically to Paris and to Whitehall, rather excessively generous and a little

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unfair to the Dominions, to the "non-European British," not to speak of the United States?

As for *Ireland* we can only comment that Federal Union would unite the Irishmen in Ireland with the larger number of Irishmen in the United States and Canada. What better commendation could be offered to Erin?

It is necessary to be quite clear that *opinion in the Dominions of the Western Hemisphere and in the United States is most certainly not unfavourable to Federal Union in the West. The contrary view springs from ignorance of what that opinion is—an open-minded attitude, ready to see what is possible. The core of opposition is far more likely to be found in Britain.* It is the British voter who has to decide—he cannot "pass the buck."

But difficulties admittedly begin to arise when the Federal Union is expected to cross the Atlantic. The British Commonwealth does, of course, cross oceans and this gives an answer of fact to the geographic doubters. But American opinion hesitates—although that opinion, as indicated by the speeches of Mr Roosevelt, Mr Hull, and Mr Willkie, and not by speeches only, has undergone a revolutionary change in this last year that makes almost any innovation possible. As Mr Roosevelt has said, America cannot disinterest herself in the kind of civilization on the other side of the Atlantic. Mr Oliver Lyttelton, President of the British Board of Trade, has saluted the Lease-and-Lend Act as one of the turning-points of history. The United States is now concerned, in the President's words, for "total victory." Beside this demand and this promise of aid in all "tools for the job"

may, however, be set the half-jocular remark of Mr Oswald Garrison Villard: "if we again have to pull you out of the hole in which your incompetent statesmen have put you, and if we must continue to do this every twenty-five years, we ought to have at least three seats in the British Cabinet to help you formulate sensible foreign policies."

Canada also is concerned with total victory. But, in its idea of after-war integral organization, Canadian opinion hesitates to go beyond Britain. As a Calgary newspaper editor said to me: "Cut out France. We will take on Britain, but not France."

Whatever the "Westminster mind" may think, Canadians do not like schemes for European Federal Union as hitherto set out. Either these schemes include Britain and not Canada, or they include both. As touching the former I recall the comment of a Canadian provincial premier—"I am dumbfounded that any British statesman should broach such a plan"—and of a leader of the Co-operative Opposition—"it seems to me like a scheme for breaking up the British Commonwealth." If Canada is to be included, I recall the comment of a Canadian late Deputy Speaker: "Canada will never be involved in any United States of Europe." Federal Union of the West, the Foundation of the Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth, suits Canada and Australia admirably, and it may suit the United States. European Federal Union, with the Commonwealth involved, is another story.

Embarrassment in Canada and the United States is paralleled by the embarrassment of certain British Federal Unionists who (unlike Streit) have

hitherto approached this matter in an exclusively European-minded fashion and who find the British Commonwealth overseas and its views little but an unresolved "irrational" in their calculations. Dr Jennings, in his *Federation of Western Europe* (1940), upsets the symmetry of his own constitution-making by having to allow to these Dominions the privilege to contract themselves out, allowed to no other member States. The rest of those whose minds instinctively turn East, not West, are in the same pit. There are many however who will sympathize with the Canadian view and who, if Britain turned away from the Commonwealth and the New World to Europe, would emigrate. The difficulty however need not arise.

Either European Union can proceed *pari passu* with Western Federal Union; or Anglo-Saxon Federal Union, with certain additions in Northern Europe, can be put as a mass power behind a genuinely universal League of Nations.¹ I sometimes think that the Europeans greatly overrate their own importance. Europe is an abstract unit made by geographers. It is an entity neither in language, religion, race, culture, nor tradition. There is, on the contrary, a bitter tradition of mutual hatreds. We must beware of "the atlas fallacy." We must beware of the over-simple attitude of the New York hostess who, having three times introduced the Dutch Minister as the Swedish, could not understand "why all you small nations do not join up." If union of the European nations is

¹ A sub-variant would have two federations, of England, France, etc., and of the Western Hemisphere, held together confederately. This must depend on the future attitude of France.

ultimately more important, since they are, in Jefferson's words, "nations of eternal war," it is also more difficult as first step in a federal movement. A European Union that excluded the U.S.S.R. has its definite dangers. *I see no reason, in logic or politics, why we should not abolish the frontiers easiest to abolish first.*

I therefore confess that I favour the second policy of an intimate Union of the Western Powers (and perhaps the Northern), loyally and vitally put behind a revived and universal League of Nations—which would also include the U.S.S.R., Germany, and certain new Federal Unions inside Europe. What is important is to present clearly to the oppressed peoples of Europe the sharp alternative, to unification and armed peace under Cæsarism, of unification with freedom and cultural autonomy under Federal Union.

* * * * *

What then about Iceland and Greenland, Norway and Scandinavia generally, Holland and the Dutch Indies, Belgium and the Congo—and, above all, France?

I do not see much difficulty in the way of including Iceland and Greenland. I see many people benefited and I do not see anybody objecting very vigorously. Perhaps "Basic English" will help here. . . . Nor do I doubt that there is very strong and genuine feeling in both Norway and Holland in favour of joining the British Commonwealth and re-cementing the old historic lands of the Empires of Canute and of William of Orange. And, after all, what first matters is: what do the people themselves want. Culturally—and this

matters a great deal—these people are readily assimilable. They have been found to be so in the United States. The Norse and Dutch are keen enough. The Norse explain, however, that they will only come in if the United States is included. The real problem is strategic and that of commitments with Sweden, Finland, or over against the U.S.S.R. It is this that might give cause to pause. As for the Dutch East Indies—a vast area—great social changes would be involved which the wealthy Dutch might not enjoy. Our Anglo-Saxon bloc is *not* “closed.” But its nucleus is necessarily far easier to settle on than its periphery.

It is when we come to the question of Union with France, with its very diverse culture and different economic level, that we get into deep waters. So much will depend upon the fortunes of war. So much will depend upon what happens to schemes for Federal Union inside Europe. So much will depend upon whether the sentiment of the Anglo-French *Entente Cordiale* can be revived after the war. France is the bridgehead with Britain for Atlantic civilization into Europe. But what kind of bridgehead? I cannot see that any country save a democracy could be admitted to our particular Federation—although it could and should be admitted to the League of Nations, irrespective of constitution. Spain, Russia, and Turkey must be in the League; and, of these, the U.S.S.R. at least is a Federal Union on its own.

Were, during or after the war, a Pan-Latin League developed of France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, then the result here for Britain would be not dissimilar in some respects from that of a draw or of a defeat.

Great Britain would, as Hitler said, be left as the apex of the Anglo-Saxon triangle, with which the Spanish world will be deeply concerned through South America. Integration, economic and political, with the transatlantic base would be, not just a matter for pleasant talk between writer and reader, *but a stern necessity of national existence*. Immigration policy, as mentioned by Mr Willkie, would become vital. This would be scarcely less true were Britain performing the rôle of an important economic entrepôt, or of a cultural bridgehead, and were she still able to occupy the position of arbiter between the Pan-Latin group and Central or Eastern Europe. If Europe insists on having Britain outside Europe—which is the Caillaux-Laval-Hitler scheme—such a line of defence for Britain becomes elementary. This is true whether Germany was left dominant or Germany exhausted and France dominant. The same argument holds, with even more force, in the event of any draw or peace dictated by Moscow. In this event we should have a Communist Germany and a Communist France. Integration with the Anglo-Saxon base would be essential or the Empire could be written off as lost. Fortunately, the present policy of the Kremlin seems to be so far dictated by stark fear of Berlin and profound “appeasement” of Fascism by “the grand neutral” that the risk this year need not be placed high. At the moment the jackal has mated with the skunk, and smells. The danger is, however, recurrent. The aptest remedy may be an understanding or alliance with Russia—but there is no reason to appease her to get it by compromising on the independence of Finland or the

Baltic States, by unlimited blackmail, or by Danegelt; strong forces will make a better appeal.

It is more pleasant to assume matters back again with France in their position of last year; and to assume Mr Churchill's June offer of Federal Union with France given and, this time, accepted. It is more pleasant to visualize our problem as that of placing a great bloc of assured and enduring power behind the League of Nations.

In this event a "set-up" seems likely to result such as I had the pleasure of discussing last year with M. Paul van Zeeland, late Premier of Belgium, and with M. Jaspars, late Foreign Secretary.

Presumably what would happen would be the paripassu development of two schemes of integration or federal union—the one between the United States and the British Commonwealth, the other between Great Britain and France. The two schemes, proceeding by mutual agreement, would be held together within the network of that confederation which is the British Commonwealth, which confederation would not be dissolved but maintained.

* * * *

As we carry matters out into further detail, numerous mutually exclusive schemes present themselves. There is probably little profit in discussing them at this stage of the war, if we want to rally opinion to practical and progressive objects instead of dividing it in wrangles.

In certain quarters, it is urged, as by Sir William Beveridge, Master of University College, Oxford, that any desirable Federal Union must be one of Britain, France, and Germany, ensuring at once, after the war, the provisional military inferiority

and the immediate economic equitable treatment of Germany. Dr Ivor Jennings, advocating the same theme in his *Federation for Western Europe*, quite frankly puts forward his plan as "an alternative to the only other solution, which is the dismemberment of Germany."

There are clearly great difficulties in the way of this thesis. There are cultural difficulties. If Federal Union is to be taken as visualizing a common legislature, at least as the goal of endeavour, there are obvious political difficulties. On the other hand, it does offer one radical and not inequitable solution of the German problem. The cultural differences, despite Sir Robert Vansittart's researches into the art of indicting a nation, are not profound. Most of what Sir Robert, in a pamphlet which provoked an adverse editorial from the *New York Times*, says about the Germans as the immemorial disturbers of Europe, a much greater historian than Sir Robert—Bishop William Stubbs—out of the calmness of a life as a professional historian, said eighty years ago about the French and their ambitions. Further, under such a plan, the natural economic development of South-Eastern Europe could take place without it being either left exclusively in German hands or artificially taken from those hands. Everything, it seems to me, must depend upon the kind of Germany that emerges at the end of the present war. In the words of Lord Halifax, in his statement of March 26, 1941, about general post-War collaboration: "I would not exclude Germany if Germany is willing to co-operate with sincerity, with good will, and with the intention to be a good European." For all I know,

after the war it would be an excellent thing to have large interchanges of British and German "veterans" to build up understanding; after the last war the serving soldier was swamped in his views by talkative, and even alien, politicians and had too little opportunity, although he was the man who fought, to express his views.

Further, if the chief prospect of British success against Germany, as distinct from compromise or Russian control of Europe, lies in blockade and air superiority *plus* the engineering of German revolution, such a Federal proposal to Germans, as distinct from the alternative, has obvious and vast tactical advantages. The scheme is difficult and drastic, but it is worth exploring. It is less drastic than to hold that there can be no true peace until all the *Hitlerjunge* are dead. As Bernard Shaw wrote, in one of his *Prefaces* (1919): "Superficially extermination seems a logical procedure both during the war and after the victory. But it never works smoothly."

Other schemes, which have indeed been canvassed for some time before the war but may become feasible as its consequences, are for a Balkan Federation; for a Danubian Federation (or, at least, Czech-Polish Federation, now under discussion by General Sikorski in Washington, with Teschen forgotten); and, perhaps alternatively, for a Federation of Germany (apart from Prussia), Austria, and Hungary. A strong argument can be made out that the breaking-up of the Habsburg possessions—so vigorously advocated by such an ardent nationalist enthusiast as Mr Wickham Steed—and the substitution of new sovereign states,

new armies, and new tariff barriers, was one of the cardinal mistakes at the Peace of Versailles, which is significantly responsible for our present misfortunes. For that Peace, however, *not* so much the statesmen (as it has become popular to say)—Wilson, Lloyd George, even Clemenceau—but the democratic electorates—you and I—stirred up by irresponsible and melagomaniac journalists, must be held accountable. May it not happen again—this evil diplomacy dictated, not by calculation, but by passion.

Again, it may well be that, from the numerous Allied Commands at present in London may spring up an increasingly vigorous scheme for the joint international defence and military control of Europe—perhaps an International Air Force available at Geneva. Promising, however, as this scheme may be, in so far as it springs from actual and practical co-operation at the present time, its ultimate success is obviously dependent upon geographic and strategic considerations and the attitude of the Great Powers. It seems more likely to fuse with a scheme of extended Anglo-Saxon Federal Union, including Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium, and perhaps France. Such a Union with strong air bases in, *e.g.*, Copenhagen, Oslo, and Amsterdam, could obviate the need for any protracted military occupation after the war. On April 9, 1941, Colonel Moore-Brabazon, British Minister of Transport, stressing “in the end the enormous superiority of air power which will be possessed by Britain and America”—and rather going beyond the argument here—said:

I believe that is the only way we shall be able to deal with these recurring wars. After all, the English-

speaking races are quite responsible, and can be trusted not to abuse that power. What is the good of talking about a new world if you do not make provision against this recurring slaughter?

Schemes are numerous for the breaking-up of Germany. The experience of the last twenty years seems to make it highly improbable that they will be acceptable to any large body of Germans or can be the basis of an enduring peace. If not, they do but prepare the seeds of the war of 1960. The advice given against them must be the sage advice given to Prussia, Austria, and Russia in the days of the Napoleonic Wars by the Duke of Wellington, when these reasonably exasperated Powers clamoured for the disruption of France. As for the great Duke, he was against them and their clamour. "If we ask France to make this great cession, we must consider the operations of war as deferred till France shall find a suitable opportunity of endeavouring to regain what she has lost. . . . We ought to continue to keep our great object, the genuine peace and tranquillity of the world, in our view." The Iron Duke's reward was peace in Western Europe until 1870—when Germany herself chose war and to call Napoleon III's bluff.

The increase of the power of Vienna at the expense of Berlin is a natural historical development; but the disruption of Germany is almost certainly not such a development. A system imposed in defiance of free choice and of historic tradition cannot be permanent. The basic difficulty is that, west of Russia, a united Germany must, on grounds of population, constitute the largest single Power in Europe.

This difficulty itself provides a forcible argument in favour of Federal Union. The problem is one of the ratio of power.

If we look backwards, then we shall allow the Western States to remain as they are and we shall solve our problem by breaking up Germany. I doubt whether yet in Canada or the United States people realize the necessity of that solution unless an alternative can be found. They have not yet begun to face it.

If, however, we are forward-looking, then we can afford to leave Germany intact and we can build up such a Federal Union in the West that Germany's maximum natural strength—as distinct from that artificially contributed by subject Slav peoples—will be negligible by comparison. Western Federation is the only tolerable solution to the problem of the potential German menace of the future. In political science, only the strong, it is the message of the historical record, can afford to be generous. This solution, of course, assumes that no German-Russian understanding remains, such as exists at the present time, and that a Communist Russia has not united with a Communist Germany—in which case the outweighing and defeat of the Anglo-Saxon Powers can be written off as definitive. The population masses weighted in on the other side would be too great.

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Whatever plans for Europe may emerge out of the present international situation as determined by the fortunes of war, two major reflections can be made with confidence.

I. First, Dr Schacht is almost certainly right—not

indeed in his proposals and remedies—but in supposing that the kind of world we shall have after the war will be a Regional World (*not*, however, to the extent of discarding the League and international economic arrangements). To reach the right results we must turn Dr Schacht around. Regionalism has been discussed in various forms since the Locarno Pact, although the spirit of Locarno was found to be somewhat volatile. We can see ahead a World of Four Major Regions or geo-political areas. In the words of J. B. Priestley, in *Rain upon Godshill*: "America, Russia, China: it is now the turn, you see, of the people of big countries, it is a renaissance of gigantic populations."

Of these Regions, the First, that of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, which comprises a sixth of the globe, is already a much publicized experiment in Federal Union. It is autarchic or self-sufficient. It extends from Vladivostok to Warsaw. On a minimum count this Russian area will include 160,000,000 people and makes the United States, by comparison, potentially a small Power. Its rulers announce that it wishes to remain under that especial régime and to take instruction from no outside peoples unblessed by Soviet grace, unless it be from the city of Chicago, city of the machine. I am unable to make prophecies whether Stalin's rule would not speedily be overthrown if any expeditionary force marched up from the south. It is or was the opinion of the military intelligence of two countries. Nor can I prophesy whether (as certain German officials, in 1939, informed me would be the case, when an Anglo-Russian Pact was under discussion) there

would not be widespread revolt in the Ukraine. It impresses me as very probable. I do not, however, think that, even in the event of revolt against Joseph Stalin's personal tyranny—and personal privilege is the parent of fear—these peoples of the Soviet Union would break apart and go separate ways. The region would remain an entity still capable of, and demanding, political organization to itself.

The significant thing here is that this political unit stretches, and so far as we can see is likely for all the future to continue to stretch, well into the heart of Europe. Therefore, all talk of a United States of Europe is in fact talk of a United States of a part of Europe—a very different thing. Whether Russia will extend its influence into the area of the Southern Slavs, especially Jugoslavia, we do not yet know.

The Second Region is China and the area surrounding the Yellow Sea. It is a distinct region in terms of over 400,000,000 human beings, mostly of Mongolian descent, united in a culture of common derivation. That area, for the greater part, was politically organized under the great Chinese Emperors. At the moment it is in a condition of disorganization. I cannot say whether in the future Japan will organize China or the noble Chinese people will organize Japan. I favour the latter hypothesis. This vast area is yet so far distant and secluded that its problems, so far as they affect world politics, lie largely—but, with Japan active, not exclusively—in the future. The organization of this region is outside the regional field of intervention of any Western Power, although not by

any means outside the range of the keenest sympathy and interest of the United States and of certain European Powers.

The position of India is peculiar. As a sub-continent, it is perhaps to be considered as a region by itself, in which case we must add one to the total of our regions. India's present position, however, is such, and its future alignment so far obscure, that it is probably better to omit it from the reckoning. For the moment it counts—and would probably wish to be counted—in with the grouping of the British Commonwealth.¹ Much will depend upon the political attitude of statesmen such as Mr Nehru. On the other hand India is not, and can scarcely be, any cultural part of AngloSaxony, however much it may contribute to it. All else remains speculation, although a tentative movement is afoot in the East for increased Asiatic unification.

Our real difficulties begin when we come to the consideration of the great Third Region. One thing only is clear. The U.S.S.R. grouping is such that this Third Region, which excludes Moscow, Leningrad, probably much of Poland, possibly the Baltic and Balkan states, cannot and should not be called Europe. It is something less than that. It is the area roughly comprised by Friedrich Naumann, during the First World War, under the title of *Mittel-Europa*, in his discussion in his book of that name.

We have already outlined, Hitler's Restored Roman Empire apart, the various arrangements possible and under discussion for this area. This *Mittel-Europa* occupies a buffer position between

¹ *Vide* p. 113.

the Slav East and the West. Germany in it performs a natural and historic function. The condition of lasting peace is the discovery of the natural functions internationally of peoples.

There remains the Fourth Region, that of the Americas and the West, that of Atlantic Civilization, certainly comprising both the major Anglo-Saxon Powers and possibly including France. The outstanding geographic region here is that of the Americas. We note, however, that the civilization, speech, and tradition of North America connects with those—is continuous with those—of Australia, parts of Africa, Ireland, and the British Isles, *i.e.* Wales, Scotland, England, the Isle of Man, and other fragments. We have here that whole group that Clarence Streit calls “the people of the North Atlantic” and that area which has been earlier called that of “North Atlantic Civilization.” Streit includes in this area France—and, I believe, rightly. Perhaps Portugal, but probably not Spain, fall within its ambit.

It is clear that the integration of this Fourth Region would produce a political system compared with which Herr Hitler’s Third Reich, even with its bludgeoned Slav subjects included, constitutes a very paltry thing indeed. The issue for the statesman is: how can it be integrated, even as the Union of Soviets is integrated?

The discussion of how this residual region of the globe, including the whole New World, shall be federally united, with its immense territorial nucleus in North America, will occupy us for most of the rest of this book. Three observations may be permitted here. This is an area that can regard

the 80,000,000 inhabitants of the Reich, or even the whole of Central Europe, with the indifference of complete impunity and the generosity of indisputable superiority, dangerous although German plans might temporarily be to it in South America. (As has been said earlier, as an essential point of our argument, a German-Russian alliance cannot be regarded with the same indifference. A permanent German-Russian alliance could sweep American trade off the seas, and could probably control South America.)

Secondly, it is an area which, unlike a Federation of Western Europe, is in no realistic danger of being dominated by the political views of France. On the contrary, France, although a member, in all save cultural matters would play the rôle of third party, rather than being accepted, as some Gallicized Englishmen would prefer, as "the better half." This is why perhaps an integration of Europe with this Atlantic area—or even with the Dominions alone—is regarded with far less favour by the French than a Federation of Western Europe, or of Western Europe plus France's allies in the East. Equally, the Norwegians regard it with far more favour. The difficulty can probably be overcome by the scheme of dual federation held together by transatlantic confederation, outlined above.

Thirdly, although this Fourth Region includes France and Latin America, what is outstanding about it is that it includes the whole of that area which I have elsewhere described, *faute de mieux*, as AngloSaxony, but which includes French Quebec, Dutch South Africa, Wales, Eire, Ulster, and the Maoris of New Zealand. Although this region

is divided by oceans, it is no more divided than the British Commonwealth, which often displays itself as singularly practically united. And this Fourth Region is united over large areas by common speech, common civilization, and common political suppositions.

A personal experience of my own, when speaking at a large representative luncheon in Calgary, Alberta, may serve to illustrate the forces that may give cohesion at least to the nuclear parts of this Atlantic Region. I found, to my own surprise, that one part of my speech was received with some warmth of favour. I had explained to my Canadian audience that I was a patriotic Englishman—one whose sentiment led him to sign hotel registers, under the column giving description of nationality, not as "British" but as "English." I added, however, that the English had long had occasion to understand the meaning of living in a composite state. They recognized, for example, the natural and inalienable right of the Scots to rule them. They had to learn to accommodate themselves to Irish—no difficult task—Ulstermen and Welsh. The "auld enmities" had been overcome. *An Englishman could never boast of any "sovereign state" of England. There had not been a "sovereign state" of England for over two hundred years.* And so, beyond the loyalty to one's own hearth and one's own countryside and the *genius loci*—the little hearth-side gods—one had to decide what was to be one's larger loyalty. To Great Britain? To the British Commonwealth? What? And for me, within the moral confines of good neighbourliness and the allegiance due to humanity, my allegiance

was given to AngloSaxony and my object was to be a good Anglo-Saxon. By that I meant—it was patent—not to be a member of a race dyed blue with woad, but of a civilization and a fashion of life that I thought of high value to the world.

I cannot see that to hold this faith causes any man to be an imperialist. Washington, conservative patriot and Virginian, would then have been “an imperialist” when he had his vision of the United States and was content to submerge Virginia in that wider community. It seems to me but another name for a developed patriotism, moving away from feudalism and the private army, away from “the International Anarchy” and national armies, towards the World State of the future. By such a developed patriotism I believe that the Fourth Region can now be organized. It is for us to do it. It might be our last line of defence in the preservation of liberty and it is our chief guarantee that we shall have the power to maintain and develop our own free, experimental civilization as we choose, excluding Nazi and Bolshevik rule.

The political, economic, and social integration of this area is the subject of this book. The danger is that, under enemy pressure, this hope which assigns to AngloSaxondom the major responsibility in controlling the destinies of the world for peace will, thanks to divisions and little-mindedness, *have become one of what Mr Churchill discussed in his book as the “might-have-beens” of history. The time is not long during which this immense work can be done. And, as I wrote in AngloSaxony and its Tradition, “is it necessary to be defeated before we learn the lesson?”*

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II. The second major reflection is that any satisfactory Federal arrangement involves the revival of the Geneva League, including the World Court and the International Labour office. The function of the League is to provide a loose, confederate substructure on which a more solid federal superstructure can be built of nations welded together in certain regions. Here we should have, as in Federation we cannot yet have, a universal and world structure. There must be no antagonism or irrelevant dangerous jealousies, wasting idealist effort, between Federal Unionists and League of Nations Unionists. Nothing can be more deplorable than the taking out of rival "patents" in the form of a 1914-18 patent against 1939-41. Twenty years' growth of experience must be allowed for between the First World War and the Second. I am informed that the Federal Union Movement has got as far in two years of this war as the League idea got in two years of the last. But I yield to none in honouring the veterans of the League who did *our* spade-work—Lord Cecil, Gilbert Murray, Frithjof Nansen. And let us be clear that Federal Union stands pledged to the revival of the League.

The World League can provide a network of federations to smooth out the mutual differences of states and of the federations themselves. At the present moment we in fact have great regions or blocs of power arranged against each other—the Reich and the U.S.S.R. and the British Commonwealth and the United States.

Will the regional organization of the world lead to new types of wars of regions against regions? How foolish a question! Are the wars of to-day

wars of little national states against each other? Are they not already such wars of regions and of regional interests?

How, then, can we improve a situation that actually exists? Only by piecing together a framework that, unless the strains are too great, will hold the whole in harness—that, further, will reduce these strains. The right process is historic, by stages. There is no infallible prescription, except the individual one of pacifism, for instant peace. But here, in a Geneva based on federal organizations, we have the best organizational means available to confirm and maintain peace.

The U.S.S.R. should be invited to come into the League. The making of the Peace is likely to be a *protracted* and not a sudden event. But at an early stage it should be insisted, if we win, that Germany come into the League. The League should be so shaped that the United States Senate will give it, with the World Court and International Labour Office, the requisite minimum of support.

The justification in international law for the Founding of the Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth and for the Federation of the West is that it will give the requisite degree of emotional energy, of concentrated military and economic power, and of unity of purpose and ideal to make the machinery of the World League work, when the world is ripe for it to work and as the world becomes so ripe.

Do not let us delude ourselves that the League of Nations *alone*, without being energized by some outstanding powerful bloc directly interested in seeing its decisions carried out—AngloSaxony, Russia, what one will—has been adequate or can be

adequate after this World War. It was indeed, as Lord Cecil of Chelwood has called it, "a Great Experiment." Indeed it was "a noble experiment." And it is not dead. But it still remains what Sir Austen Chamberlain called it, "a free assembly of sovereign states." It could not operate Article XIX of the Covenant because it was constitutionally tied to a species of "Polish veto" against all but unanimously voted change; and because it was condemned necessarily to collapse when a statesman such as M. Titulesco announced that "Revision means War." It never became "a sovereign assembly of free states." Only by Federal Union shall we get such a "sovereign assembly." And, since we cannot begin with world federal union, perforce we must begin regionally with those Powers most interested in making the League, as liquidator of differences, work. It must provide the universal world framework *until* the day, still remote, comes when universal federation is possible. Progressive federation must implement the League intention.

It is no use relying upon an aggregation of Great Powers, with too diverse interests and heterogeneous cultures, as a positive force: the most we can hope here is, by League machinery backed by some entirely decisive Federal force, to check aggressive wars and refusals to appeal to arbitration under a revised Geneva Protocol of 1924. We must have that decisive force. If we do not choose to talk in terms of power, we had better talk some pure, uncontaminated faith such as pacifism. It is no good relying on a collective security provided by a congeries of "good" Small Powers or of just the

Powers we happen to like, taken at random. Wishful thinking and weak provocation are the twin curses of politics. I recall Mr Malcolm Thomson's comment, in the London *Evening Standard*, on a book by that lady, exiled from France, who now expounds with Gallic intelligence to the dull English the real thoughts of their American cousins but who earlier was so unfortunate in her political interpretations of her own country. I refer to Madame Tabouis.

She tots them up and jots them down,
The Czechs, the Poles, the Yugo-Slavs.

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The Switzers have a mighty fleet,
Put that upon the credit side,
And Peace looks firmer on her feet
When Comrade Stalin's cossacks ride
To join the fray to save the free
Spurred on by Madame Tabouis.

It is noteworthy that Professor Gilbert Murray, in a criticism of Federal Union, expressed pessimism whether Federal Unionists would be able to prevail upon absolute sovereign national states to surrender a measure of this jealously guarded sovereignty, at the request of a *majority of foreigners*, which the League had never asked States to surrender. The late Frank Simonds, of Washington, in his brilliant but sardonic *The Price of Peace*, reached the same conclusion about non-surrender of sovereignty, but he applied it as logically fatal to the League also and its hopes. He hammered up the placard "No Hope"; and advised large national armaments. Lord Cecil of Chelwood, in his *A Great Experiment* (1941), refers to "the passionately held doctrine of

National Sovereignty"—especially so held by the late Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. He rightly thinks that the United States Senate will not surrender this doctrine for the *beaux yeux* of Geneva. It might surrender it for a more restricted Union—but this might provoke a counter-union of autocracies. The answer, I submit, is that *we already have this*; and it is not to be appeased for love of internationalism. If Sovereignty is not to be disturbed "more than necessary," then we compromise with—here I agree with Professor Laski—the very source of the evil, the cause of the downfall of the League itself, the sower of the dragon's teeth of war, with Satan. The attack must be frontal and direct, if attacking by stages. To what other purpose the sweat of a world-wide war? Shall we have a Third World War to settle the matter? It is interesting, however, to note that Professor Murray makes a reservation in his pessimism: political Federal Union might be possible *between countries that are like-minded States, which countries have no differences likely to lead to war*. They are not "foreigners" to one another.

The League alone, without the United States, or on any basis on which the United States Senate is likely to consent to American accession, is certainly not enough by itself alone. It is something worth while. It is something that the United States may support, after this war, as a universal international framework *not* demanding cession of sovereignty by its members. But it is not enough. The League is limited by its own nature as an instrument not involving cession of sovereignty. It is, moreover, well to recall that one of the most hopeful

of organizations associated with the League—hopeful for the future and hopeful to the League because of the United States' participation in its activities—the International Labour Office, has achieved only very modest success. Barbara Wootton writes (*Socialism and Federation*, 1941): "During the first (and most successful) ten years of its history only about one-third of the possible total of ratifications of twenty-six agreed conventions had been secured. Twenty-five countries had ignored every single convention and the majority had ratified less than half of the total." These are the political realities of the past. The League of Nations sprang from the last war. Federal Union behind the League, if the movement continues as at present, as the sole dynamic Liberal alternative to Moscow Communism, offers alternative political realities for the future that are more hopeful. That Federal Union, however, as Professor Gilbert Murray says, must be "of countries that are like-minded States." The Anglo-Saxon peoples, and (at least) the Scandinavians, *are* such like-minded countries and States.

* * * * *

All this is, it may be said, a grandiose scheme for the Anglo-American domination of Europe, which will be no better than the German. Or for an Anglo-American-French *condominium*. It is not.

It can indeed be urged—and I have some sympathy with those who urge it—that *the British have never yet been prepared to take the full responsibilities of their powers in Europe, and have thereby damaged Europe*. They have always, when the victory has been won, sought to retreat into

irresponsible isolation. The same is still truer of the Americans—and their blame in 1919 was even greater for starting the stampede away from international responsibilities in the name of peaceful normalcy.

The peoples of Europe, in a choice, would probably prefer a control of Europe, maintaining peace and police, of which the effective voice rested with Anglo-American power than one of which the effective voice rested with German or even Russian power. *An Anglo-Continental bloc buckled to a Pan-American bloc through the British Commonwealth would fill this need.* We should see a world where, in effect, Liberalism was maintained by the power of the new Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth—some writers (such as Sir William Beveridge) would say federated even with Germany herself. It would, I think, be entitled to compel federation in Europe and to tell States, small or great, who declined to co-operate that it would treat them as the North treated the Secessionist States of the South, until they would accept the position that the Southern States accepted after the Reconstruction era. It would, I think, also be entitled to state that if, *e.g.*, Russia after the war declined to enter the Geneva League, this would be regarded as a hostile act. Germany would be given no option.

This trend to isolationism, however, is a permanent historic characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. It will certainly recur after this war. It is essential that, this time, international pledges given shall be of a nature that the British Parliament and the United States Senate will in fact keep. That sets, as I shall show, a close limit. And it is

highly desirable to provide, *through regional Federal Union, a catchment* within which the receding waters of emotion, ebbing after the peace from war, general intervention, and universalism, can in fact be held and stayed. Who attempts more will probably succeed in nothing. Who achieves this will seal and give shape to that Anglo-American friendship which the veteran socialist Robert Blatchford envisions as the most important leverage for liberty in the world. It gives a task and a program for that day which will come, as Mr Churchill said to the Pilgrims in welcoming Mr Winant on March 18, 1941, "when the British Empire and the United States will share together the solemn but splendid duties which are the crown of victory."

III

THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERATION

THERE are lions in the path of Federation, whether Anglo-American or wider. There are those who believe that Federal Union is not economically possible. And there are those who believe that it is not desirable, even if it were possible.

One of the frequent criticisms of Clarence Streit's proposals is that he has not sufficiently considered the economics of the matter. Thus, in a recent issue of the *New Republic* (February 26, 1940), Mr Harold Nicolson writes "unless that [federal] form is carefully examined in advance by trained minds, it will not prove a firm foundation for a peace of equity and justice, but merely a large and glittering balloon entirely filled with air. . . . Supposing that a Federal Union were made among seven countries of Europe, what would be the effect of such a union upon such commodities as copper and rubber? Until all these problems have been worked out in some precise inductive form I fail to see the difference between Federal Union and an armed coalition on one side, or the League of Nations plus free trade on the other."

Mr Nicolson is an honourable man and I am far from suggesting that he is not merely asking questions from a pure desire to know.¹ Nevertheless,

¹ Cf. Mr Nicolson's very constructive attitude quoted on p. 39.

certain points will be noted. He uses that humour and satire which are the well-known route of escape from an argument of logic and fact. He assumes that the nature of "a peace of equity and justice" is so well known that its demands can be put ahead of the case for Federal Union instead of Federal Union being regarded as the sole basis, of any profundity, for enduring peace and for a system of executed international law and of law courts that render significant the phrases "equity and justice." "What will happen to copper and rubber" is made to look equally important with the case for peace through Federal Union itself. "Some precise inductive form" in "all these problems" is demanded as answer. And, although Streit labours at length to distinguish Federal Union from both the League of Nations plus free trade and from military alliances, Mr Nicolson is unable to detect the differences.

In fairness it should be added that Mr Nicolson may well not have Streit's scheme primarily in mind. He may rather be referring to schemes for the federal integration of Britain and France (and later other countries—as M. Politis, of Greece, suggests) which are rather governed by wishful thinking about the future of the *Entente Cordiale* than by precise consideration of the administrative, economic, and social consequences. It should, moreover, be noted that Mr Nicolson states it to be his own opinion that "a more reliable world system . . . will almost certainly take a Federal form."

As to demands for information about nickel and rubber, it so happens that Mr Streit (on the table

THIRTY MEASURES OF WORLD POWER

Measure	Fifteen Democ- racies	Three Autoc- racies	Soviet Russia	Remain- ing Coun- tries
	<i>Per Cent of World Total in 1937</i>			
*Nickel production . . .	95·8	0·0	3·0	1·2
Rubber production . . .	95·2	0·0	0·0	4·8
Motor-car production . . .	90·2	6·3	3·1	0·4
*Ground-nuts production . . .	90·0	5·0	0·0	5·0
Gold reserves (known) . . .	89·6	2·9	1·6	5·9
Sulphur production . . .	82·2	15·5	0·0	2·3
*Wood-pulp production . . .	76·2	17·0	3·2	3·6
*Iron ore (m.c.) . . .	72·7	6·9	12·7	7·7
Tin production (m.c.) . . .	72·2	1·1	0·0	26·7
Gold production . . .	72·2	3·9	16·8	7·1
*Butter production . . .	71·2	16·2	5·6	7·0
Merchant-ship tonnage . . .	70·1	17·5	1·9	10·5
*Air traffic (miles flown) . . .	66·7	10·8	14·4	8·1
Petroleum production . . .	66·0	0·3	10·0	23·7
*Copper production (m.c.) . . .	65·0	6·7	4·8	23·5
Foreign trade (value) . . .	65·0	18·0	1·1	15·9
Coal production . . .	65·0	18·8	9·4	6·8
Raw cotton production . . .	64·7	0·6	10·0	24·7
*Natural phosphates production . . .	64·2	1·5	29·3	5·0
*Electricity production . . .	63·1	19·0	7·9	10·0
*Wool production . . .	63·0	1·8	5·2	30·0
*Lead production (m.c.) . . .	61·6	7·6	3·3	27·5
Steel production . . .	60·6	21·4	13·1	4·9
Aluminium production (smelter) . . .	56·3	34·1	9·1	0·6
Silk, artificial, production . . .	47·7	48·4	1·3	2·6
Area . . .	46·3	4·4	16·0	33·3
Population . . .	43·1	12·3	8·3	36·3
Wheat production . . .	42·6	11·6	23·3	22·5
*Potash production . . .	25·2	63·6	6·0	5·2
*Silk, raw, production . . .	0·4	86·6	3·1	9·9

*1936, figures for 1937 too incomplete.

(m.c.)=mineral content of ore.

This table is computed from data in the League of Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, 1938. For other explanations see text.

overleaf) supplies it in the most striking form. Streit continues, in *Union Now* (Cape):

It is precisely in the things that are most essential whether to modern civilization or to war that the fifteen [democracies]¹ are most powerful and the autocracies weakest. The democracies produce more than 95 per cent of the world's rubber and nickel, the autocracies none. The autocracies have

less than 1 per cent of the oil and cotton,
 less than 2 per cent of the tin, natural phosphates, and wool,
 less than 3 per cent of the known gold reserves,
 less than 4 per cent of the gold production,
 less than 5 per cent of the world's area,
 less than 8 per cent of the ground-nuts, iron ore, copper ore, and motor-car production,
 less than 11 per cent of the air traffic.

In all these 16 things, except area, the fifteen democracies have more than 60 per cent of the world total, and in all but cotton and lead they produce in their own territory more than 65 per cent of the world total, with high ratings in motor-cars, gold reserves, ground-nuts, and tin. They also have more than 65 per cent of the world's trade, electricity, and coal, and more than 70 per cent of the butter, merchant shipping, wood-pulp, and sulphur.

The fifteen democracies, in short, are shown by this table to be in a position to control overwhelmingly the world's most essential raw materials—minerals, fuels,

¹ Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, U.S.A., Great Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland. The argument in the text is to some extent affected if France and Scandinavia are omitted. But it will be noted that it is not the argument of the present book that they should be omitted if it is feasible to include them.

textiles, chemicals, foodstuffs—its manufacturing resources in such things as steel and wood-pulp, its transportation resources in such things as ships and motor-cars and airplanes, its commerce in general. . . .

Each democratic citizen averages nearly five times more money in the bank than each autocratic subject, and the banked wealth of the fifteen is more than seven times that of the three (Germany, Italy, Russia). Excepting the special case of France—that wealthy people which is habituated to keeping its savings in the sock or in bonds or abroad rather than in the home bank—the *per capita* banked wealth in each democracy is greater than the highest *per capita* rating among the autocracies. With the exception of Finland, Belgium, and Holland, it is more than twice as great.

Britain's dominating position in the pre-war world was based on a navy equal to that of the two next strongest powers put together. Table 5 shows that to attain this power standard as regards the only countries that threaten war, and to attain it not only on the sea but on the land and air sides, the fifteen democracies, once united, would need to disarm instead of arm.

Yet Table 5 reflects only dimly the real war power of these democracies as compared to that of the Triangle, for it omits potential power. To get a true picture one needs to consider this table in connection with the other tables, especially Table 2, which shows the overwhelming superiority of the democracies in war essentials. The autocracies are like poker players who make a strong impression by putting most of their money on the table, while their opponents (the democracies) put only their small change on it and keep the rest in their pockets.

Fifteen democracies together practically own this earth, and do not know it. Each of these democracies was made to secure precisely the same object, the freedom of man, and they all forget it. These democracies have no one but themselves to blame for their difficulties and to

fear for their freedom, and they do not see the beam for the mote.

United, these fifteen are (within human limits) almighty on this planet. They are united in holding dear the Rights of Man, but not in maintaining them throughout the land of the free. They are united in practising the principle that in union of free men there are freedom and peace and prosperity as well as strength. But they do not practise it beyond their borders even with each other to preserve it against those who sacrifice the freedom of man to the freedom of his government. United, these fifteen democracies become impregnable, secure beyond danger of attack, and the world is made safe for individual freedom and saved from further economic and monetary warfare. But they are not united. There and nowhere else is the rub.

These details seem to me, in all conscience, striking enough. But if any man, before he decides in his own mind whether he wills Federal Union, needs to have more of them the fair expedient is, I submit, obvious. Details of the precise effect upon the world's economy of bringing rubber and nickel under one political control are highly technical. No single research worker can express an opinion that, unchecked, would carry decisive weight. Much would depend upon the homogeneity in labour policy of the peoples federally uniting; upon the conclusion of a study of unemployment problems; on the extent of governmental control contemplated. What we shall wish to know is whether the total of these objections is so grave as to invalidate the case for Federal Union in a given area. Obviously what those must do who are raising these objections honestly, and not from mere desire to "floor" the other argument, is to press for the appointment,

whether by governments or by technical or commercial bodies, of expert commissions to report on these issues. But there is no proper case, in war-time and amid all its urgencies, to hold up discussion of Federal Union politically until such time as the committees have sat, considered, reported, and have published their report and had their report considered by "trained minds."

Actually no little of this technical work has, in fact, already been done, and the results arrived at have not been negative to the feasibility of Federal Union on its economic side, although there has been divergence on detail about how far the postulated Federal Government should have entire power, *e.g.*, to regulate tariffs.

Under as eminent an economist as Sir William Beveridge (author of *Peace by Federation?*) in Britain, a technical committee of economists has sat and brought in two reports on ways and means. Professor Lionel Robbins, one of the members of this committee, has produced a pamphlet called *Economic Aspects of Federation* (1941).

This pamphlet itself contains a condensation of the arguments in Professor Robbins' *Economic Causes of War* (1939) and *Economic Planning and International Order* (1937), which latter was the first book in Britain systematically to develop the general economic arguments for federation. Professor Robbins argues in favour of the federal control of immigration and restrictions of migration; federal control of money and currency—not necessarily uniformity, *e.g.* Canada with a Canadian dollar is yet in the dollar bloc; of monopolies; and of armaments. He insists, following the basic

argument of Hamilton in the *Federalist*, on the federal right of taxation in any *completed* Federation, with its corollary, the federal right of expenditure on, e.g., public works. There is no objection to State economic experiments, in nationalization, or, as in Alberta, in Social Credit, so long as this does not impose discriminatory restrictions on the interstate trade of other States of the federation—and this it is for the Federal government to decide. It is noteworthy that Professor Robbins says: "Federation necessarily involves some degree of like-mindedness and like educational levels"—and, it should be added, like levels in general standard of living. Entirely free migration could not, for example, immediately be extended to include all India—which anyhow may (but probably would not) prefer total independence, thanks to its different culture.

Another project has been urged, in the *London Spectator* (November 15, 1940), by "Balbus," speaking on behalf of a well-known technical group:

Modern war has become so technological and so total that it cannot be waged with any chance of success unless backed by an extremely high industrial potential. War could thus be made much less likely if we could set up in Europe an industrial organization which cut across national boundaries and operated in such a way as to prevent the industrial potential of any great nation from being mobilized as a whole for armaments production. . . .

This could be arranged for along some such lines as the following. In each major area, such as Europe, industry would have to be organized on two levels. In the first place, single industries or groups of industries would be required to form a series of Regional Associations, so distributed as to cut across national boundaries

whenever possible (though different industries would of course differ in their geographical set-up). Each of these would have to operate as a unit. The separate associations would have to submit their programmes of marketing and production to the second type of body. Each of these latter would represent a major area as a whole, and would act as a producers' co-operative entrusted with the job of buying the necessary substances from the raw material controls and distributing them to the regional associations. Let us call them Area Distributives. . . .

This can be done if the entire business is entrusted to a Reconstruction Commission, through which alone raw materials and credits, as well as other help, would be allotted, whether for the relief of hunger and disease, the rebuilding of devastated areas, or the development of industry.

Is not the real progress in the unification of the world to be made along economic and technical lines? Yes—but "yes" only if we are contrasting new technological developments with disappearing political forms such as the National State. "No," if the implications are those of nineteenth-century "money-thinking," non-social thought. There is, indeed, a school which believes that Federal Union should be primarily economic; and that, if these economic areas are organized by public cartelization and joint industrial controls, mere political and cultural organization can be left to take care of itself. It is not a school with which I sympathize. It evades issues that cannot be evaded. I divide from the Economic School. Either, under a misleading guise of economic determinism, we have here a proposal for a return to a capitalist theory of "no government in business" and an advocacy that

big business men and financiers get together and settle things. Or we are ignoring the fact that precisely the institutions visualized as control organizations, economic and technological, when they determine on any decisive action, will be the object of bitter political discussion. Mr J. E. Meade, in *The Economic Basis of a Durable Peace* (1940), has to posit an "International Authority" partly concerned with political questions. I do not wish to dispute that "technology is the motive power in history" (Brailsford). I see, however, no means by which the ultimate controls in such matters can cease to be political and to be shaped by the form of the political organization of the federation. Somebody is going to have the power of the purse, and whoever has it will have the deciding voice constitutionally, whether it be the constituent States or the Federation. It is for this reason that federal taxation must be contemplated as an early, although not as an immediate, goal. I do not, of course, deny the possibility of a temporary economic "lateral attack," which may be more successful than a political "frontal attack."

It is indeed possible to take the exact opposite line urged, *e.g.*, by certain Dutch jurists of what I will call the Political School, and to say that political federation offers far fewer problems than economic. This is the view I understand to be expressed by Dr Veraakt, professor of law in Delft University and of the Dutch Ministry of Justice.

* * * * *

The real economic difficulties of Federal Union do not come from the adjustment in technical *matériel* of nation to nation as such—the difficulties

here are political and the advantages economic. It does not come from any failure to recognize that an economic Federal Union would indeed give greatly enhanced strength to democracy, just as the Soviet Federal Union gives to Communism and Dr Schacht's economic integration of the Reich gives to National Socialism. On the contrary, without such wide-scale economic integration and planning neither the Soviet nor the Reich systems, embracing so many peoples, would be possible.

The grave difficulty lies in the economic integration in one Federal Union of peoples with very diverse standards of living, *without* accepting the National Socialist thesis that some folk are to be considered superior to other folk.

It is desirable to point out straight away that this difficulty arises in an acute form in any schemes for a Union of Europe or for Anglo-French Federal Union. It confronts the Germans to-day in their attempt economically to organize Europe. But it does *not* arise acutely in any scheme for Anglo-American Union since the British standard of living, although lower, is not conspicuously lower than the American. Mr Willkie was a bold man to propose free migration (presumably among persons of white race) which is entirely to the British advantage; but with tact even this lion might be laid low, especially as the American "pioneer frontier" would again be reconstituted by adventurous men in the Canadian North. Anglo-American Federal Union is, therefore, practicable *now*—whatever the case may be in a depression after the War—as Anglo-French Union is not. On the other hand, the difficulties in the way of Anglo-

Scandinavian or Anglo-Dutch Union are, on this score, slight.

What is required is, not the abrogation of the Ottawa Agreements but the elimination of their narrowness by the inclusion of the United States, the Argentine, and (with some modifications) South America. The City of Huddersfield, with its Yorkshire woollen industry, has provided an interesting example. Huddersfield buys its raw materials in Australia, processes them at home, and sells them in the Americas. Closer economic integration would be all to the good for Huddersfield. In this way an economic bloc can be formed that can defend itself, even against Dr Schacht. It can do more. It can extend its free-trade system into Europe and Africa as the opportunity widens.

* * * * *

What, then, are to be the relations between economic blocs? World Free Trade is desirable only if there are guarantees, not just of profits for the dividend-drawer and international investor in accordance with the customary processes of capitalist imperialism, but for the small producer and for the common citizen. World Free Trade will not be socially beneficial if it makes countries exclusive specialists in the one or two industries or occupations that, judged solely on a money basis, they can undertake best. There must be a certain symmetry of economy which can produce the healthiest social life without being necessarily the most profitable. We must get away from the ideology of a money economy and substitute that of a goods economy—nay, more, health must come before wealth, health is the first wealth, and common wealth must come

before private wealth. Further, workers must not be thrown out of employment and ruined, who are in fact in no position to emigrate, because of rivalry from labour employed competitively at lower standards abroad.

It is not necessarily the case, under modern production, dependent on machine tools, that lower-grade labour turns out the worse product. The skilled craftsman may be at a heavy disadvantage. In order to survive, there is the temptation to desert the "low grade" domestic market, where the worker is producing what his own wages can buy, in order to produce for a more artificial international "high grade" market that has no social obligation to him at all, if the vogue changes and he falls out of work. A reasonable consumer control and price control, possible in a limited market, is still impracticable in an unlimited one. The result is economic insecurity and unemployment.

World free trade is possible with, but only with, a world control of the labour market, of wages, and of prices. Unemployment will only be eliminated under a controlled labour market where high wages do not invite a deadly foreign competition but where, within the controlled area, high wages can be guaranteed to be used to purchase domestic goods and to make their large-scale production profitable to the manufacturer or state-trust which pays the high wages. High wages, except as in the days of the Industrial Revolution when *e.g.* Britain had "the world for her oyster," is a function rather, for the most part, of controlled markets. Towards a world-controlled market we must work. But we have not reached there yet and, while standards of

civilized demand remain so disparate, we shall not reach it to-morrow.

Of course, it may be argued that the quick and ready way to deal with the difference between "haves" and "have-nots" is to reduce all abruptly to the level of the moujik and the coolie. This is not an answer likely to be acceptable to the Western working man, whatever he may say about international socialism. It is not even economically advisable in the interests of civilization.

If we cannot get a world-controlled market and a world-controlled labour market to-morrow, then we must seek the next best thing—a control of prices, of the labour market, and of money in as wide a region as we can in fact secure it, with the enjoyment of the advantages of free trade within those areas. In delimiting these regions, amid the many political, cultural, and strategic factors to be taken into account, a similar standard of living and a complementary economy will be the major economic factors to be reckoned with.

The relations between integrated economic regions must be themselves controlled by negotiation. Economic relations there will of course be. The Americas are dependent—although not anything like so much as Britain hitherto, with its unhealthy luxury economy—on Europe as market for exports. Dr Schacht is fully politically alive to that and to the power a resolute consumer bloc possesses to put the thumbscrews on a producer who fears unemployment. Unlike Dr Schacht, neither the Americas nor Britain have deliberately cultivated self-sufficiency or an autarchic economy as essentials. That may perchance come; and the Western bloc

has many advantages which Europe has not, if it does come. Indeed the lesson of investment in areas under foreign controls is not one encouraging to Americans. I see no reason to suppose that relations need be, as Dr Schacht visualizes, chiefly relations of barter or even of quotas.

What it does mean is that, confronted with such rigorously closed economies as that of the U.S.S.R. and that which the Reich endeavours to create, the West must put itself in a competent condition of defence, even if this involves much sacrifice of capitalist freedom to try to carry on private international negotiations on one's own. Anxious as I am to maintain the freedom of the individual, the freedom that flows from security of possessions, including wages for the small man (and for every man in a small, equal way), and the freedom of social, speculative, and material experiment, I believe it a fallacy to oppose freedom to a measure of economic planning. That planning *may* increase the range of substantial personal freedom. Whatever diminishes the menace of insecurity, political and economic, increases freedom at only a reasonable cost in personal restriction.

I do not suppose that the League and the International Labour Office can eliminate *all* economic stresses, even allowing for the normal progress towards equalization due to the reorganization of labour. At least we can suppose a Federal system under which we shall know where decisive military power lies, if any country chooses to decline to negotiate and to flout invitations to economic conference instead of war. I do not, again, suppose that Federal Union will eliminate automatically *all*

economic strains within the Union. But such strains are not absent in the present national States—not in the United States, for example, between the textile mills of Massachusetts and of the South. *The result, however, is not war*; and this is my reply to Professor Laski's alleged "fatal objection" to Federal Union. Where, rarely, the issue is war, as in the American Civil War, the result is to reaffirm Federal Union and compulsive political peace as having priority. In his brilliant and searching book, *Where do We Go from Here?* (1940), Laski bargains for a Social Revolution during war-time in order to win victory through revolt in Europe, and he postulates the cession by the highly paid or rich of their controls as a condition of victory on his hypothesis and as condition of patriotism. He has, he feels, the rich scotched by a cleft stick—a "Morton's fork." His belief is that, as a weapon of power, economic class community, revolutionarily active in a crisis, is stronger in war than the traditional emotion of a common way of life. I doubt it. It follows that he must rather emphasize economic divisions, pregnant with sudden change, than political cohesions for peace and slow change. However, it is noteworthy that he regards Federal Union as a *more fundamental* attack on the roots of war, in national sovereignty, than the League of Nations. But he cannot forget that war is a supreme tactical boon for checkmating capitalism. And he places the same stress on economic equality now that I place on the abolition of war now. Laski wants instant Revolution with all its *sequelae*—a new French Revolution. (The drawback of the French

Revolution was that by 1833 the French Revolution had done less for democracy in France than had been done in Britain *without* a revolution, but with John Wesley and Francis Place.) I want instantly a League to Enforce Peace. This last has reached a higher stage of general consent. Equality has actually a lower priority than Liberty or Fraternity—although in any true sense it follows from them and is their synthesis.

Defence apart, during the war and during the Reconstruction period afterwards, institutions will be required—perhaps a World Raw Material Resources Board and an International Food Distribution Commission—which will suppose a large measure of national and regional collaboration of private enterprise under control of regional organizations. We have already the British United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, connected with the Ministry of Supply. These organizations will be essentially political and will presume, in turn, a common governmental policy in the background. To achieve satisfactory results for the West, in war-time or after victory, in dealing with Central Europe and with reconquered territories, it will be infinitely more effective if the West itself acts as an economic unity, in coping with issues that are likely to be of twenty years' duration. Otherwise, to put the matter mildly, jealousies will arise as they always have arisen among the victors. Who will not go back, must go forward. And integrated economic action, international *and* regional, can well emerge, not *de novo*, but out of the present war-time problems of economic defence and of a constructive economic warfare policy and food

policy. This policy can well proceed concurrently with plans to strengthen the International Labour Office and other Geneva organizations. But this *economic* unification will be found to involve a concurrent *political* unification, whether in the League or in the regional Federal Union.

* * * * *

There is another lion whose name is, not Pessimistic Do Nothing, but Flaming Jealousy. It is an interesting and significant fact that most ardent Marxists, and especially recognized leaders of the Communist Party, are vigorous opponents of Federal Union. One can almost test their Marxism out by their reaction on this matter.

In many ways this is very odd. It is of course true that Federal Unionists do not see world peace as only achievable on the further side of world civil war. It is true that they specifically do not accept as satisfactory the Marxist analysis of the causes of war which logically ends in this thesis of the inevitability of civil war between "haves" and "have-nots" the world over, including Britain and America. But it is also true that the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics—a Union without any geographic title—is itself one of the most conspicuous instances of a Federal Union in the world. It was indeed the especial boast of Stalin that Lenin's policy and his own had successfully welded together federally over a hundred different nations and speeches, White Russians and Cossacks and Turcomans and Uzbeks and the rest. It is, of course, also true that, in fact, this Federation was somewhat highly centralized for Western tastes.

There is then, it appears, *nothing doctrinally wrong*

with Federal Union as such, but only with "capitalist" Federal Union that has not yet gone through the blood bath of civil war. It is a different kind of question that we have to put to get to the heart of the matter. If we want to know from what quarter we have to expect opposition, we merely have to ask whose political game will be upset. *Cui bono?* Even a political simpleton could, I think, guess the answer. Federal Union of the West will clearly gravely interfere with the Marxo-Bolshevik game of world revolution for the peculiar benefit of Russia. It would be highly inconvenient to have such a Union. How, then, will this Bolshevik attack on Federation take shape?

Federal Illusion? (1940) by Mr Denis Pritt, late counsel for the London *Daily Worker*,¹ will serve to enlighten us on this. Mr Pritt moves Mr Wells into position as a critic of Federal Union, incontinently denounced by Federal Unionists. He omits to note that Mr Wells has devoted one entire chapter of his *The New World Order* to denunciation of what he calls "the mental traps of Marxism" and of Mr Pritt's own solution of the international problem. As an even heavier gun, Mr Pritt moves up, to the attack of Mr Curry's popularization of Streit, Professor A. V. Dicey, long-dead Vinerian Professor of Law at Oxford, with his three tests of federalism: the supremacy of the constitution over the constituent States; the distribution of sovereign functions; and the authority of the federal courts to interpret the constitution in a fashion binding on

¹ In this case of *Citrine v. Pountney* (1940), one of the witnesses, Mr Francis, stated that his expectation was, "in the near future, a civil war."

the federal and state courts. "A federal system," Dicey said, "can flourish only among communities imbued with a legal spirit and trained to reverence the law." Does Mr Pritt conclude that the Anglo-Saxon peoples constitute such a community, as I shrewdly suspect that Dicey would with his sense for the unity of the lands of the Common Law? Does he even agree with Professor Dicey himself (as I do) that there must be "a very peculiar state of sentiment among the inhabitants of the countries which it is proposed to unite"? If so, Mr Pritt will agree with the precise thesis of this book. Mr Pritt does nothing of the kind. Rather he indulges in a rhetorical pessimism about "the major states of to-day."

The mere idea of their being willing, in these days of increasingly fanatical nationalism, to accept any treaty-made constitution as definitely binding upon them, when it comes into conflict with their commercial or industrial interests, seems idle.

Does, then, Mr Pritt really wish to suggest, as would appear from this, that major states cannot unite unless they fulfil Dicey's condition of common sentiment and of being a "law-fearing people"? Not a bit of it. Eminent counsel is here putting forward a case in order to destroy the opposition case. For himself he has to believe, as a good party man, that all the nations of the world can be federally united, white, black, and red, in a system that extends over the world the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Why, then, all this special pleading? For the very simple Marxist reason that a Federal Union that does not include the U.S.S.R. would *be most unwelcome to the Russian*

Foreign Office, to the exact extent that it is desired by the Western peoples and is, therefore, practicable.

I confess to one point of substantial sympathy with Mr Pritt and with Mr John Strachey, in his *Federalism or Socialism*. A Federal Union of Europe, all Europe, Europe alone and Europe excluding Russia, obviously raises difficulties. But this is quite irrelevant to Western Union of the United States and the British Commonwealth. If, however, we avoid any unification of Europe that would take the form of an anti-Comintern Pact and we welcome the U.S.S.R. into the Geneva League—as I have suggested in this book—is anything left to which Russia could conceivably take exception? Nothing, were Russia one peaceful country among many; but very much, as Mr Pritt sees, if Russia is the homeland of the Comintern with *her own quite distinctive plans for world order through local civil war*. Mr Pritt's reply to these criticisms would doubtless be to represent them as an attack on Socialism. But the "Socialism" here in mind is, not Mr Wells' "world collectivization," but that which is the parlour name for Marxist Communism. The Socialists of the British Labour Party Executive have already expressed, with adequate clarity, their views on this matter of terms and definitions by expelling Mr Pritt from their number and by obtaining an overwhelming ratification by the Party Conference which even declined to hear Mr Pritt's apologia. Even Mr Strachey, late Marxo-Communist "fellow-traveller," declares in *The Betrayal of the Left*—after having found some of his late associates "supremely clever fools," talking irrelevant doctrine when "the Nazi knife

was at [their] silly throat"—that there is nothing whatsoever "in an ever-increasing degree of Anglo-American co-operation which need weaken [the] people's struggle." Strachey's *Federalism or Socialism* is merely a demand that the radical economic issue shall be confronted, coupled with a doctrinal, dogmatic, and (in my opinion) fallacious assertion of the priority of economic arrangements to political and military, *i.e.* of Economics to Power, in any practical project for peace. Strachey refers contemptuously to "federating the tigers" of Britain and America as at present constituted. If we substitute (as we legitimately may) the words "England and Scotland" we shall see how silly—or, to use Mr Strachey's own word in dealing with critics, what "bosh"—this is as an objection to the feasibility of this Union for the advancement of peace. Mr Strachey when he wrote *Federalism or Socialism* was perhaps still keeping what he now regards as bad company, but the gravamen of his accusation is no more serious than that Federal Union which sets out to do one thing—namely maintain peace within an area—does not do another. If, of course, Mr Curry claims that it will do that other, then it is for Mr Curry and Mr Strachey to fight the matter out off stage. Assuredly Federal Union is not inconsistent with economic justice. It is only inconvenient for those who believe in the exclusive concentration of energy on instant Social Revolution during war advocated by the defeatist supporters of the Russian Foreign Office, our enemy's new-found friend. Item, about whether Mr Strachey's own "sole genuine medicine" for permanent peace would so undoubtedly produce

that peace, Mr Strachey—his intellectual honesty and his rigid doctrinal obscurantism coming to blows—contradicts himself.¹ The most polished of our contemporary sophists, I doubt whether he can extricate himself from this pit to live to fight again to square facts with theories. There is a danger in those who would gamble a Commonwealth for a word. Anyhow, the general reader will be adequately warned, by this account, of the nature of one vigorous line of anti-Federal-Union criticism.

It is difficult to know what to do about it. For purposes of this war, Britain and the United States are, to Russia, "bourgeois capitalist Powers" and, to Germany, "pluto-democratic Powers." Nothing that the British Commonwealth or the United States is likely to say or do during this war is likely to do anything to change this attitude, which is a matter of policy. Merely they "hate our faces"; and that is the end of it. It is rash to suppose that Stalin's present policy is so entirely opportunist—such a construction of his policy is not Rauschning's, in his *Revolution of Nihilism*—or is inconsistent with Lenin's. Lenin's announced and well-known policy is that it is the duty of the workers not to interest themselves in wars between still "capitalist" (*i.e.* non-Communist) Powers but to concern themselves with bringing down the "bourgeois" governments *first* under which they are living. It is strange that such publicists as Mr Gollancz and Mr Strachey discovered and announced this so late. Apart from Lenin's classic declaration, after the Zimmerwald Conference, of the triple route to successful revolution, including the discrediting of the ruling class

¹ Cf. reference *supra*, p. 24.

or government at home by defeat after being embroiled in war, Stalin, in 1924, wrote: "The development and support of revolution in other countries is an essential part of the victorious revolution." It is now obvious why, as Mr Gollancz states, at least some of the Stalino-Communists *wanted* war (*Betrayal of the Left*, p. 5). This is distinct from the condemned and less adaptable thesis of Trotsky that the Communist Revolution could not be successfully established in any one country unless a world revolution is simultaneously being permanently waged. The War may, indeed, resolve itself into a fight between unexhausted Russia and unexhausted America—unless Stalin decides that the game is up; the risks of internal trouble too great; and his bread best buttered on the side of the Western Powers. I am prepared to agree with H. J. Laski that blue funk may account for part of the policy of Stalin, the "grand Municheer" and appeaser, a left-handed Chamberlain—fear not so much for Russia as for his own class interests as a challenged dictator afraid of revolt in the South. But, in all fairness to Stalin, I think it should be admitted that his policy is also defensible as good Leninism.

If we admit, even in part, this Leninist interpretation of Stalin, then Russian policy becomes clear. This is, both by Russian foreign policy and by the aid of the workers, to produce military stalemate between "capitalist" Britain and National Socialist Germany (with which, according to Rauschning, Stalin may have some genuine sympathy). Or to produce total economic exhaustion. In brief, it is to spread war, starvation, and dis-

affection abroad and to keep peace at home in the lands of the "great neutral" that is economizing its resources for—if Hitler doesn't act first—the final blow which will leave Russian nationalism without a rival. Then a German Communist Revolution becomes possible and would be precipitated, which the West will be in no conceivable position to control. My suspicion would be that Rudolf Hess's flight is a quest for some alternative to just this throw in the Nazi-Moscow game of *entente demi-cordiale*. This Revolution, whether from below or by connivance of Nazi leaders, can, by all historical probability, rapidly be followed by a French Communist Revolution and an Italian Communist Revolution. Whether these Communist Governments could in fact maintain themselves, save in Slav lands, near the Russian homeland, is open to doubt. My personal belief is that, in the West, the *ultimate* issue might well be a swing-over to Fascism. But, at least, a confusion would be caused—not unaccompanied by starvation almost Russian—in which the workers would be left for sixty years marching towards the promised Utopia, while Russia was free to consolidate herself, safe from all immediate enemies in the West. There is certainly genius in such a policy—especially for a Power that, potentially strong, is actually at the moment weak, and which has only just escaped "by the skin of her teeth" from the menace of the *Mein Kampf* policy of a German march East.

It will be obvious that, from this Marxo-Communist point of view, American aid for Britain must be regarded as deplorable—but according to "capitalist" plan. It is a stand of the two great

capitalist Powers together. But that American aid should be converted into Anglo-American Federation would be nothing less than catastrophic. Indeed, as John Strachey points out, for such British Communist leaders as the Swedish Hindu, Palme Dutt, "the most important factor in the world situation, the factor which underlay everything else, was the antagonism between the American and British Empires"—it was the key to Bolshevik success. (Similarly, the doctrine of class war at home, as distinct from pressing for the abolition of sectional interests, sapped and poisoned the strength in crisis of the Western democracies.) As it is, American action bids fair, if it is properly handled, to stymie this Russian policy. Anglo-American Federal Union would permanently mean that the dominant power in the world could not be Russia profiting by the exhaustion of the rest; and any revolutions taking place in Europe would be organized from the West and would avoid plunging Europe into a Slav chaos. In any other kind, however, of Russo-German union than one issuing from joint Bolshevism, Germany must, thanks to her technological skill, play the dominant rôle and, to avoid that, Russia must come to reasonable terms with the Western Powers. At present she is deterred from this, not by any cruel rebuff to her love of the West, which has never been conspicuous in the public conduct of her statesmen, but by her greater fear of German armaments, which will continue until the West is united and a greater fear of Western armaments succeeds.

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What, however, do the "capitalist"—and by pre-

sumption to-day, "reactionary"—Western Powers propose to do about *economic* and material reform? What do the advocates of the Federal Union of these Powers propose to do to rebut the charge of "reaction" in these matters?

I have read with attention the recent *War by Revolution* of Mr Francis Williams, late editor of the *Daily Herald*. His exposition of the Nazi propaganda case is admirable. But, frankly, his statement of the opposing case seems to me to be understatement. He does not go far enough. The Western democracies—denounced as "pluto-democracies" or "bourgeois capitalisms"—are seriously menaced by being left holding the bags of Old Order Nationalism (avoided by Federal Union); of Old Order defence of the *status quo* (avoided by Federal Union); and of Old Order Capitalism, as distinct from a reasonable respect for individual personality. The case for Freedom against Cæsarism is handicapped by these burdens.

Mr Williams advocates a "Federation of European countries," while hoping that the British Dominions and the United States—who seem to belong very much to another hemisphere—will come into some kind of world economic scheme presumably operating through Geneva. The American objection to this would be, I think, in effect: "Hitler is uniting Europe, while you people are talking about it. What actual union have you worked out between your Allied Governments, including the German refugees? And why don't you attend to the areas in the New World where Union is actually going forward, and make that a sincere working example to the Europeans, instead of wishful talking?"

Mr Williams advocates a declaration that the sole authority of government springs from the people; that there shall be the rights of personal liberty and liberty of opinion, discussion, and association; that all have an equal claim to enjoy the benefits of education; and that all shall enjoy security from poverty with a claim to a secure standard of life such as shall enable them to maintain health, physical happiness, and a decent life.

I submit that we need to offer concretely cheap good housing at not more than 20 per cent of the wage-earner's income; free holidays for school children; holidays with pay; a state-subsidized national welfare and travel movement comparable to the German "Strength through Joy"; the State-recognized legal right to a job; an economy founded on consumer's and worker's needs, not on the profit index; price, labour-market, and money control; old-age pensions for all, partially based on contributions by all, scavenger and millionaire; no segregation of an insured "lower class"; national health provision for the middle classes; a "People's Radio" and a "People's Car" at cheap prices; theatre and opera at rates within the pocket of all; compulsory labour service (as advocated by Marx and Trotsky); such elimination of class divisions as is symbolized by officers and men having a common mess. I submit that we offer at least these things because if we offer them we are not doing *better* than National Socialism. We are merely offering what National Socialism offers to Germans, and in some part carries out in cold fact (London *Times*, March 8, 1941; but *cf.* article in *The Economic Journal*, by C. W. Guillebaud, Dec. 1940). But

we need to do this—not least in America—with a united, strong, and recognized Trade Union movement, instead of under a Nazi system of domination of servile peoples by their superiors. We need the recognition of a constitutional rôle of co-leadership with government and technician to be played, in any liberal society, by the trade union leader. The repeal of the British Trade Union Law Amendment Act of 1927 might go along with this.

If we want to do better we might add on the Russian educational provisions for crèches and kindergartens; the Russian system of free medical clinics; free access for trade unionists to sanatoria for convalescence; an improved system of accident insurance—and, of course, free secondary education on a test. We could add to a national Army and a national Post Office the nationalization of certain vital industries of production that are by their nature monopolistic. It would all cost no more than the War and could be met as the Germans, not to speak of the Russians, meet it. The lot of the hereditary rich man cannot be expected to be a happy one, nor do I, for one, expect that it will be. Family self-esteem should, however, be adequately protected and a man's natural interest in the progress of his children. And the talent of the manager—even of the financial manager—will of course be adequately protected. Men of ability will find their way, or be conscripted, to the top.

I do not discuss the replacement of the personnel of the ruling class by new men more identified with the masses. This has never yet been a problem in the United States or the Dominions, and it is being solved fairly rapidly in Britain and, as the

consequence of the war, will be solved much more rapidly. The problem of the hereditary bureau-aristocrat or oligarch is more likely to become acute in Russia, where a new Revolution will be required to achieve democracy in that violently mechanized country of peasants accustomed to absolutism.

This economic programme I consider to be an adequately progressive programme for Federal Unionists to advocate for the present. Let us talk realities and in terms of the concrete—not doctrine and party theory—and where it is better to learn from foreign examples let us do so quickly and draw the benefit. I do not of course flatter myself that the British soldiers are fighting for Socialism. They are fighting, so far as an idea is involved at all, for democracy and freedom from police and boss *interference* — in brief, rather for individualism. Not that, as I have said, these things are, save superficially, contradictory. But Socialism may become an abstraction, while the common man of common sense, however much individualist, fully sees the point of pressing and gearing the national economy for the production of a cheap family car—not luxury export cars—cheap theatre, cheap, good clothes, cheap houses . . . and a sure job.

If Federal Unionists wish to preach effectively, then, while urging that Poles and Bulgars should revolt to achieve these economic advantages for the people, they will do well to insist on their acceptance in principle and fact by Governments for Englishmen and Americans, and indeed for Anglo-Saxons generally, beginning with returned soldiers. What is good enough for Germans and Russians is not

too good, in these richer lands, for Englishmen and Americans.

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There remains the question of the relation of Federal Union to what is called "imperialism"—and especially "economic imperialism."

The oft-repeated Marxist defeatist argument that this is an "imperialist war" is usually coupled with the suggestion that both Britain and the United States wish to maintain their "dollar empires"—"dollar empires" overseas from which their "ruling classes" (and, be it added, their "privileged workers") derive large dividends or unfairly high wages compared with less-favoured folks.

India I have already discussed. I am an uncompromising advocate of Indian independence, for both Moslem and Hindu. I do this consistently with my general theory on the ground that there is no, or a quite inadequate, *cultural community* between Anglo-Saxon and Indian to form the basis of an organic political structure. However, I believe that, were independence thrust on India, as in the Philippines, *a demand would arise among the Indian leaders to maintain the Commonwealth bond.*

Africa is quite another matter. Here seems to me to be a case for that large-scale "planning" to which so many people are addicted.

Large-scale "planning" here has none of the objections that can be raised against it in a country of an old civilization with its proper individualism. On the contrary, it offers the chief means of protecting native races, in the process of a change-over of economy, from grim, speculative exploitation by

private interests and to substitute what, without excess of paradox, I may call a co-operative Sovietism in Africa in its place. This form of government is precisely adapted to a backward agricultural or pastoral people towards whom a benevolent bureaucracy must play a not-over-conspicuous trustee rôle. It is a rôle in which I believe that the highly educated American negro can, properly trained, perform an important function as a civil servant, which will be beneficial both for him and for Africans who have remained in Africa.

I venture to quote here the views I set out—since I have not changed them—two years ago in *AngloSaxony and its Tradition* (Kegan Paul):

Russia has worked out certain blue-prints, in industrial insurance, in kindergarten education, in free medical attention (in practice often without anæsthetics) for the workers, which are not so much creditable to the Soviets, although they are this, as disgraceful to rich democracies that have not adopted them long ago. Russia has given to the workers the sense (however optimistic in relation to the reality, and however become daily more uncertain as mutual suspicion increases) that it is *their* country, just as in Germany the workers have the sense that Hitler is *their* Führer. This is the strength of totalitarian religion. Russia, moreover, has made an immense material advance, which indeed sets up no standard for general imitation among the civilized democracies of Western Europe—who have led, are entitled to lead, and should lead—but which is remarkable and almost miraculous in a Euro-Asiatic state.

As I travelled across the miles of plains to Rostov-on-Don I asked myself what was the ground for this advance, which, to many minds, is the decisive testimonial to Lenin's course, however many millions of

lives that course may have cost, in civil war, to Russia and the world. Was the explanation Communist ideals or Marxist ideology or State-Capitalist planning, or true co-operative Soviet planning?

The explanation, I submit, is none of these things. Since the days of the opening up of the American Middle West, which drove the United States at a bound from a third-class to a first-class Power, there has been no area of equivalent size and richness developed until the opening up of Russia, and especially Siberia, since the Revolution. This has been done by the industrial methods of the Twentieth and not of the Nineteenth Century. The Revolution released forces latent but rendered inert by Russian apathy and the corruption of the *ancien régime*. The Russian people have inevitably benefited. The new bureaucracy at least was not interested in filling the pockets of the nobility and of cotton kings and timber kings, although it squandered as much upon building up the most gigantic military machine in the world as a first instalment of the new Utopia.

If the Anglo-Saxon political system is to be commended to the electorate of England and Scotland, of America and Canada, as better than the Russian, how is this commendation to be made? Assuredly the test that this electorate will apply will be the pragmatic one of *results*. These Western countries are very rich countries. How should they show to the common man *better* results?

So far as the British Commonwealth is concerned, a clear answer can be given.

There is now, on the entire earth's surface, only one space capable of startling development comparable to that of the American Middle West and of modern Russia. That space is the Colonial areas of the British Commonwealth. Some of this space, such as Jamaica and British Honduras, is rotting from lack of forethought. It would be better to pay off honourably our American Debt by leasing for 999 years an area for an American naval base in this

region.¹ In Kenya and Nyasaland, lack of an adequate agricultural policy may turn a colony into a desert. It is high time we abandoned the petty-minded provincialism of Lord Palmerston, who sincerely thought that only Europe—the area that Jefferson called “lands of eternal war”—mattered.

The last decade in Europe saw the vogue of catchwords, “rationalization,” “planning.” Some of them were due to the impression made by Lenin’s Russia, with its slogan of “co-operation and electrification.” There were the Russian Five-Year Plan, and, later, the German Four-Year Plan, and, all along, the Webbs’ Plans, as well as de Man’s and others. They had this kernel of truth, that anarchy and *laissez-faire* have been shown by experience, in our contemporary, complicated, large-scale civilization, not to be the most satisfactory guarantees for the liberty and economic security of the common man. On the contrary, in many fields, public control is the appropriate guarantee of this security. With many people, however, planning—however essential in the right place—became a substitute for thinking. The habits of the country, its morally legitimate individualism, its existing co-operative associations, its voluntary organizations, may well all be resistant to this variant of the proposal that the State is All, and the plansters its masters. At home, planning is necessary, but its scope is limited and its objects must be precisely defined.

The Colonial situation is abruptly different. Hitherto, the British people in the Homeland, and, to a lesser degree, in the other British Dominions, have regarded the Colonies as “possessions,” areas perhaps for profit but also for apology, about which the less said the better. Such an attitude is morally and politically irresponsible. . . .

The moral duty of AngloSaxony is to develop, with the resources that only AngloSaxony possesses, this vast

¹ This was written in 1938–39.

area until the time comes to transfer it, as a substantial basis of wealth and power and as a *peculium*, to the direct rule of Geneva or a World-State which requires such sovereign possession to give it dignity.

If the great African continent is to be developed without wastage, and without more than the misery of the European industrial revolution, there must be a planned co-ordination between the physical development and the economic, and between the economic and the governmental. In the Sudan, as in Fiji, in the Katanga, and in some abortive projects in South Africa, such co-ordination has been attempted. For the rest, it has been too conspicuous by its absence—and this, as touching production and marketing, more so in the British colonies than in the French. The lack has been due, in part to want of finances, in part to want of ideas. Lord Hailey's book is a massive plea for this co-ordinated development:

"The task of guiding the social and material development of Africa gives rise to problems which cannot be solved by the application of routine knowledge. . . . This study must be pursued in the field of the social as well as in that of the physical sciences. But for this purpose assistance is required from the Imperial Government."

The policy of material development combined with promoting health organizations: this is recognized—by the Belgians. The issue of local government for the de-tribalized native: "it is a problem which so far has engaged more attention in the Union and the Belgian Congo than in the British colonies." The necessity for stimulating the cultivation of subsistence crops: "the Belgian Government may be said to have taken the lead in the study of questions of this type." There is the need for scientific research—in which the Germans did excellent work. "The British Government has hitherto given *less* support to institutions devoted to the study of African languages than, for instance, has the German Government." Rhodes is dead, very dead.

In a primitive continent, in transition in the inevitable process of opening-up, public plan, social planning, may be the *best possible protection of the native* from private exploitation. There is one sole area in the world where, by co-ordination of scientific and geologic research, of transport, of mining and crops, of sanitation, of population movements, a result more startling may be attained even than in Soviet Russia, a result that can put Germany and Italy, avid for colonies, in the shade. That area—this imperial cloak of cloth-of-gold about us—is the British Colonial Empire, a section of a Commonwealth that controls a quarter of the world. Mr Neville Chamberlain might reflect that this is opportunity—including opportunity for our own unemployed engineers and steel industry—beyond the dreams of Joseph. Lord Hailey, as an administrator, should know well that by preference we are a nation that chooses to do nothing—a nation that, if God is just, deserves to lose. Perhaps Lord Hailey will succeed in dynamiting this nation into action.

We need a United States of Africa under the direct control of the League at Geneva as our goal. But how far the Portuguese, French, and Belgians would, here and now, welcome this desirable settlement I do not pretend to prophesy. Lord Lugard, in his pamphlet *Federation and the Colonies* (1941), discusses these difficulties. In the interim, we need the development of the vast British area—on trustee principles, in the fashion already indicated, and with *the increasing use in administration of negroes*, including American negroes—under the Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth. This domestic undertaking, quite as much as control by international bodies of gentlemen not free from pressures by the speculative exploiter and international financier, is what is important. There is no reason why

American wealth and engineering or Dominion ability should be excluded from this field, which is a steady invitation to British engineering and technical skill—and to the youthful technician, unemployed when war-work stops—once the requisite public financial resources are put, by the Federation, behind it.

The development from military and trade imperialism to cosmopolitan control must follow the stages of an historic process. The Soviet Union, repudiating interference with its Turcoman “colonial” population in Siberia, regulating all by a co-ordinated plan, but fully acknowledging cultural autonomy and the principle of nationality, sets an interesting example—if *too exclusive* in its rigid prohibition of economic penetration by outside powers. Participation, however, in this work of development and trusteeship must be a prize worth acquiring by outsiders, *e.g.* the Germans and Italians, by entering the Federation, and not “a natural and equal right to make money” which any State can claim as its due. That is little better, if any, than the imperialism it replaces; and is more irresponsible. The “colonial” plan must be federal, democratic, and socially controlled in purpose, and must inevitably exclude the plans of would-be beneficiaries who are neither. Nor do we want a banker’s scheme of financial helotage. It is in this federal and co-operative sense, and not in that of capitalist free trade or exploitation, that the Van Zeeland Report, of 1938, should be interpreted. World Free Trade or colonial Free Trade must not mean the abolition of the International Labour Office—*laissez faire*—but its strengthening. But it also means the strengthening of regional controls.

IV

WHAT TO DO: THE TIME PERSPECTIVE AND THE POLITICAL PRESENTATION

THE minimum requirements of a full-fledged Federal Union would be:

A common citizenship, including the right to vote in any place of residence and involving the removal of passport restrictions.

A common defence policy.

Free migration, subject to such restrictions as obtain domestically at present.

A currency based on fixed relations, if locally distinguished.

The right to regulate trade by Federal Legislation and through an interstate commerce commission.

A common law, and a common supreme court of appeal on issues in dispute between collective members or individual citizens.

A common allegiance, such that engaging in war against any member involves treason and will so be treated in the courts.

The right to declare peace and war, with such common control of foreign policy as this may imply.

The right of taxation.

Clarence Streit enumerates the first, second, fourth, fifth, and eighth of these requirements and describes the constitution of a legislature and an executive commission. Mr Wendell Willkie,¹ it will be noted, enumerates the first four as desirable now—and Mr

¹ On citizenship, *cf.* address by the Rt. Hon. L. S. Amery at Chatham House, November 30, 1926.

Willkie aims to be the next President of the United States. Dr Ivor Jennings enters into the full details of a Federal Constitution, although his provisions for the control of colonies directly by the member States, the peculiar status including right of secession given to the British Dominions, and the apologetic position given to the Federal President in relation to the States raise doubts whether Dr Jennings attaches the central importance that I would do to the clear placing of sovereignty in the Federation, in its ultimate form, and to the unequivocal transfer of allegiance as goal of the Federal process.

It will be noted that, in the British Commonwealth at the present time, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council supplies—in some restricted fashion and at least as touching certain Dominions—a common court of appeal, although the court here contemplated is rather based on the analogy of the Supreme Court of the United States. In many points the British Commonwealth as a system may offer a preferable initial model.

Further, a common citizenship does not necessarily exclude local regulations governing migration. Among British subjects there are numerous subdivisions. Canadian citizenship, acquired by a British subject from the British Isles or Dominions after five years' residence, is something distinct from, *e.g.*, citizenship in Scotland or the Punjab, with separate local regulations and obligations. Also, for good or evil, separate currencies obtain in the different parts of the Commonwealth, although the case for an international currency issued from Basle may have a strong argument in its favour.

The currency, however, of many of the Dominions (not Canada) and of certain other countries is within the sterling bloc within which certain ratios obtain; and Mr Wendell Willkie has proposed the establishment of a stabilized dollar-sterling ratio.

The U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission constitutes a useful example in building a wider trade-regulating body, if not for the entire Federal Union, then, at least, for North America. Study of the International Waterways Commission might also be helpful in certain particulars.

I see no immediate reason to "lower the flag" of either the United States or of Great Britain in the event of the political integration of those countries. We have it on the authority of so eminent a constitutional lawyer as Dr Jennings that the Union here contemplated, or the Union between Britain and France, would have no effect on the position of the King, who would remain King of Canada and "King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India," even if he does not resume his old title of King of France. In Canada we can still hoist the flag of Canada or fly it concurrently with the Union Flag. Or a Geneva League flag might be flown generally. Such symbols should be adopted as in fact secured collaboration and did not emphasize difference. The heralds can doubtless work out some adjustment that will look glorious, complete with stripes, fleurs-de-lys, and white ensign. What matters is to be able to tell constituent member nations what Andrew Jackson told South Carolina—that action against the decisions of the Union is treason.

Full-fledged Union involves a common judiciary,

legislature, and executive, with entire charge of foreign policy, and defence. It includes the co-ordination and regulation of commerce, industry, and labour, as between different states and abroad, and also includes interstate free trade, the prevention of disease, and encouragement of invention, together with rights of direct taxation. I think, however, that it can with some excuse be urged against Mr Streit that, in his *Union Now*, proposals are presented on a flat plain of immediacy which allows for logic but not for history. An analogy with the history of the United States over a hundred years, from the Articles of Confederation through the Constitution to the Civil War and Lincolnian interpretation of the Constitution, is condensed into a single plan of immediate requirements. We may need, it may be said, more historic perspective.

To this Mr Streit may very well reply that the whole history of confederations shows that they either break up or are compelled, under pressure from outside, to integrate into Federations. Especially the history of the Articles of Confederation illustrates this. Similarly Leagues must proceed to Federation or will dissolve after the fashion of temporary alliances for national interest. This argument is indeed only confirmed by those technical international lawyers who object to Federal Union on the ground that federations are unsatisfactory and only a unitary state desirable. These gentlemen are in too much of a hurry—or they want Hitler's form of union.

Unfortunately the human race is less than logical and only learns with difficulty from experience when its immediate interest, fears, or inertia

encourages it to follow another direction. Politically speaking, the introduction to new ways will have to be by stages, although we may salute Mr Wells, who thinks that even Clarence Streit does not go far enough or voice his demands clearly enough, and who proclaims the need for radical revolution, falling monarchies, and the rest—although “really nothing very new or startling.”

One will not break up the four-century-old attachment to national sovereignty overnight, even although it was the major aim of the American Founding Fathers to repudiate the lawyer's doctrine of sovereignty and although every Englishman and every Scotsman, far from being a citizen of a sovereign England or a sovereign Scotland, is member of a Confederation in which it is impossible to tell where sovereignty resides. Such is the traditionalism of human thought that, once men's minds begin to move, it is far easier, as they revise their notion of Union and Commonwealth, to get their thought lapsing into the ancient grooves which mean a sovereign Canada and a sovereign New Zealand, a sovereign Wales, a sovereign New South Wales, a sovereign Texas, and a sovereign Quebec, or any other variant of a sovereign Bulgaria, than along newer and more evolutionary lines. And yet it is as certain that the advance will come of international organization beyond the national state as that the national state advanced beyond feudalism and “the baron sovereign in his barony.” Every man is part tribesman and barbarian. Not all have civilized this tribalism into a lawful and restrained “love of the little platoon.” To get a change requires bold ideas coupled with practical political judgement.

Everything, then, I submit, must depend upon the time scale in putting forward successfully the project for Federal Union.

If I am discussing what may happen thirty or sixty years hence, if indeed I do not present a plan for a World State, I can present a plan for a Federal Union complete with two Houses of Congress, Executive, system of elections by States for a Senate and, on the basis of population, for the Lower House, "one man, one vote," not to speak of full provision for dissolution of the House, Cabinet responsibility, amendment to the Constitution, and so forth. All this has been admirably done by Mr Streit, Dr Ivor Jennings, in his *Federation of Western Europe* (1940), and Mr R. W. G. MacKay, in his *Federal Europe* (1940)—the last two being eminent lawyers.

It is, however, perhaps most profitable if we concentrate our attention neither on the immediate task with public opinion nor on some kind of horizon goal but, let us say, on the situation at the next Peace Conference and what we should expect to secure then or before then. We have the immense asset that projects, regarded as fantastic or at the best with tepid approval in peace-time, may be translated overnight into practice as the best possible route out of misery amid the violent passions and tragic hopes of war. War has few benefits—but the practicability of revolutionary change in men's ways of thought is one of them. That benefit should not be wasted by timid procrastination or old-maidish prudence. History is impatient with timidity.

Here let me confess a difficulty. In the light of what has just been said and of the well-known

technique of propaganda, it may seem unwise to temper demands beyond those of the ultimate goal set up by principle. He who asks for 100 talents of gold may get 40. He who starts by asking for 40 will get 5 or—wily politicians thinking him a coward—none. It is precisely the propagandist strength of Clarence Streit that he has assumed the rôle of a prophet and maintained it single-hearted—he has not tried to be “a practical politician.” At the end of a long speaking tour through Canada I found myself in a mood to tell a semi-technical gathering in British Columbia what, as a minimum, I thought one might accept within the next three years—that is at, or immediately after, the Peace Conference issuing from this war. One member came up afterwards and thanked me. “For the first time,” he said, “you have made the project seem to me practicable.” But the following day the secretary of the meeting said: “I have been thinking over that matter during the night. I don’t think you asked enough. Men won’t fight for just that. They want more of an ideal to work for.”

With this caution, then, I will say that if I thought—to take, as instance, the Federal Union of the Western Peoples—that I could get representatives of the United States, the Dominions of the British Commonwealth including Britain, and France, to come together in Conference, perhaps with a purely economic agenda drafted by Mr Hull, and yet with the specific intention of developing a Federation; if this Conference of the North Atlantic resolved to meet regularly, by rotation in Washington, London, Paris, and a Dominion capital, every one or two years to discuss all regional problems without ex-

cluding issues of sovereignty from discussion; and if this Conference gave its blessing to discussions of yet more intimate institutional collaboration on the one hand between Paris and London, and on the other between Ottawa and Washington—if I could accomplish this within three years, I should feel that I had done very well.

Concretely, I suggest that, by or before the beginning of the Peace Conference, we should have a Conference of the English-speaking Commonwealths established, meeting annually in the capitals of the English-speaking world by rotation. This Anglo-American Union should not necessarily exclude other countries. Of this Conference I suggest provisionally that the King should be President. The President of the United States should be Chairman *ex officio*. The office of Vice-Chairman should be occupied by rotation or election. I visualize Mr de Valera, General Smuts, or King Haakon as possible vice-chairmen. The office of Secretary should also be by election; and Mr Eden's name occurs to me as that of a desirable first Secretary. His League of Nations experience would be of value and would guarantee collaboration with Geneva.

I see no reason why Committees on Joint Defence, Foreign Affairs, Priorities and Production, Raw Materials Export and Food Supply should not be set up, under the Conference.

All this, it may be objected, amounts to rather less than the American Articles of Confederation, if perhaps to a little more than the British Commonwealth's Imperial Conference. Let us admit it. Nevertheless, it presents, as it were, a "Mirror of

Federation" in the becoming. Moreover, it is my profound belief that, once matters are cast in the right mould, the shaping can be left to time and the historic pressures. It is my conviction that, once the trend of affairs is set through Confederation towards Federation, then—by Mr Streit's own historical argument—no sooner will any pressure or threat show itself from outside than the whole will crystallize into a Federal Union, militantly resolved upon efficient defence. But Federal Union will only be so achieved because the clear idea of it is *now present* in the minds of our contemporary Hamiltons and Madisons, and because we can and do achieve Regional Confederation of peoples within this decade and as direct consequence of the gravity of *this* war, together with the forging of the competent instruments for Federation. We must here and now *accept the idea without reserve* and at the same time *get all "set" for a developing and increasing practice* of Federation. We have, further, got to get *enough* operative Federalism now to defeat both the "Old Adam" of anti-Federal national sovereignty at home and the fierce hostilities of enemies abroad and their paid or volunteer agents.

Two comments require to be made. First, no opponent of Federal Union is more dangerous than the man who, dwelling in lands of roseate sentiment, sees no reason why the friendship of the English-speaking peoples or of the West should assume any institutional form. I agree that the first steps in an institutional form are not necessarily treaties or some cast-iron constitution. That may not, in fact, be the way to get things done. To begin with,

I agree that common citizenship and free migration matter more than formal treaties and elaborated constitutions. But mere sentiment is not enough—any more than it was with the Anglo-French *Entente Cordiale*. As Sir Norman Angell has repeatedly pointed out, the whole difference between the peaceful history of Anglo-Saxon North America and the warring history of Spanish South America lies in the fact that the former was united in a common political bond and allegiance and the latter was not. It is not even true that “the British Commonwealth will keep the peace,” since, even if it alone had—which it has not—the power to do so, its confederate form prevents adequate collaboration ahead of time. The British Confederacy acts together—but it acts too late. In the great words of George Washington: “Public opinion is not government.” The hen of sentiment that will not lay the egg of common institutions is not really a good hen.

Secondly, let us be clear that we have *got* to go forward, in the great Anglo-Saxon adventure, to the building of institutions. *Because, if we do not go forward, we shall infallibly go back.* Anyone is very naïve indeed who imagines that, if we do not go forward to Federal Union of some kind and if American marines remain in Newfoundland and American battleships in West Indies bases five years after the peace, there will be no recriminations and bad blood. The only hope is decisively to go forward beyond hope of looking back, so that the carpers and critics (whether from choice or subsidized) can immediately be “put on the spot” as secessionists and traitors. To break up the Anglo-

American connection and to make bad blood will obviously be the prize task immediately after the war of every enemy. The best course is, with Mr Churchill, to welcome burning our boats.

Against defeatism we have got to put the words of President Roosevelt in his personal message, by Mr Willkie, to Mr Churchill:

Sail on, O Ship of State!
Sail on, O Union, strong and great!
 Humanity with all its fears,
 With all the hopes of future years,
 Is hanging breathless on thy fate!

* * * *

Let me state the issue of the Time Scale in a rather different way. I suggested recently in a letter to the London *Times* that Federal Union will come as the issue of four stages, which have to be passed through in order.

The first stage is cultural. I agree with Señor de Madariaga, with Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, and (if I understand them aright) with Professor Gilbert Murray, Mr Duff Cooper, and Mr Harold Nicolson, that this is the basic stage. There must be a sense of Community. It can be found in a common Tradition as much as—or, rather, far more than—in Race or Doctrine.

This stage we already have for all the English-speaking peoples. It merely needs to be emphasized by education. Both, as Streit urges, by the common notion of democracy and also by the common strands of Humanism in Western culture or of a "Grand Tradition" we can, it may be, extend the field of community feeling into Europe and China, in due time.

The second stage is that of common defence. That also we have already fully reached, as between the Allied Powers and those who have promised their every aid necessary to victory. It involves the actual exchange of military plans and mutual consultation on strategy. It deeply affects foreign policy, especially where the factors that decide that defence must be a joint defence—as in North America—are felt to be permanent factors dictated by geography and interest alike.

This stage may, however, serve to bring together temporarily other peoples outside the Anglo-Saxon bloc. In some cases the present military united command, *e.g.*, of Norse, Dutch, Belgians, and others, together with the British, may offer prospects of being mutually advantageous permanently. A collaboration initiated and cemented in war-time may be capable of continuation in the peace.

The third stage is economic. It is not the case that this economic collaboration, in the shape of international or regional institutions, will be an affair of the post-war or reconstruction period only. Union or integration on the basis not only of common armed defence, but of the economic collaboration necessary for common defence, already exists. Behind the North American Permanent Joint Defence Board, which is one of the gigantic historical innovations of our time, lie schemes and practices for the collaboration of American and Canadian factories—and of American and British factories. Joint economic committees, facilitating Anglo-American military supply, are at this present time being established in the United States. The economic stage has been reached; and economic

integration has passed already into the stage of actuality. It is, moreover, precisely these fields of war-time collaboration that are most promising for noiseless growth into the phase of post-war economic control institutions, tariff arrangements, and joint commissions.

The fourth and last stage is the political. It may be the most difficult—although many would argue that this applies to the economic stage. But it cannot be evaded. It cannot be said too emphatically that Federal Union offers itself as a practicable project to produce enduring peace.

If we do not accept such a project then the alternatives are Hitler's restored Roman Empire, keeping peace by Cæsarean force; Marxist Communism which believes there will be enduring peace only on the other side of civil war with capitalists and all their dependants, including most of the middle class; and pacifism, which is a strictly individual route that invites the pilgrim soul to eschew trying to change "the world" by the forcible ways of the world. The continuation of the old system of State divisions means the inevitable continuation of wars—means world war again in 1960 and means it quite inevitably, nations being what they are. To this we must answer, "Never again." The Social Revolutionary "new order" would definitely be better. Federal Union, however, equally emphatically is naught unless it spells *the abrogation of national political sovereignties and the actual abolition of frontiers*, beginning with those in brute fact easiest to abolish.

This stage may be approached through regular Conferences having executive powers, and so forth.

The point is that *it has to be approached and entered upon*: not evaded. To walk round in hopeful circles, avoiding the issue, in a statesmanlike fashion, is not enough. Either we want it or we do not—and, if we do not, we must select our alternative.

My concrete and immediate suggestion is that we take the precise proposals of a highly responsible politician, Mr Willkie, and that we implement them one by one. Agreeing with President Roosevelt that *the basis of a Union must be an open basis permitting of the admission of any suitable, adjacent nation that desires admission*, there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that the present Democratic Administration in Washington would view these proposals otherwise than with favour.

Let us begin with proposal number one:

giving to holders of American passports in any part of the British Empire and of British passports in the United States the full value of citizenship.

(Wendell Willkie, *Sunday Express*, February 2, 1941.)

Let us pass a bill through the British Parliament implementing here and now this proposal. Several members of the War Cabinet are favourable. Its symbolic value would be immense. Its practical inconveniences would be quite negligible. The Foreign Office and the Law Officers would have to consider and digest a few minor technical difficulties such as confront them already in a more acute form in the case of Irish and Canadians. Let us suggest early and simultaneous legislation, as in the case of the Statute of Westminster, in Ottawa, Canberra, Capetown, Dublin—and in Washington. Then

we can proceed to legislation on emigration and currency. If we delay, from timid caution, until the international situation become worse, the opportunity may fade. If we delay until we are debating again "who won the war," the opportunity will be lost.

These are immediately practical steps that, in the present condition of public emotion, although not necessarily always, are likely to command the assent of the vast majority of men of good will.

* * * * *

Not only the Time Scale is important. The Political Presentation of the idea of Federal Union is important.

In its principles Federal Union means the same thing in whatever quarter of the world we may propose to apply it. Very briefly, it means the abolition of frontiers. As a practical project to be applied in a specific region, the case for it requires a presentation suited to the needs, prejudices, and interests of that region and, again, of its member countries. The presentation of the case in Canada should not have the same coloration and emphasis as the presentation of the case in the United States or Britain or France; or *vice versa*.

In Canada, the case for Federal Union must be presented as satisfying the need, so definitely and generally felt there, for a distinctive and native Canadian policy.

A distinctive Canadian policy is one that avails itself of the features peculiar to the Canadian situation. Of these the most outstanding is that Canada is both a country in the New World and a member of the British Commonwealth. A policy that recognizes the first position without breaking the connections that retain Canada in the second

position is likely to be both distinctive and acceptable. *It must be a New World policy that is also a loyal Commonwealth policy.* It must move towards the greater integration of the world, ultimately in the framework of the League, and not towards disintegration. At the same time it must recognize the reality of a specifically Canadian culture.

One of the assets of Canada is its remoteness from the Old World scene. Any policy, therefore, that could be visualized as involving Canada in a war of 1960 or in the Old World disputes of "nations of eternal war" would be repudiated in the reaction to isolation that is quite sure to succeed this, as every, war. Another asset of her position that indicates for Canada a peculiar function is that she, especially, can act as broker between the Old World and the New. Already, in the economic sphere, we find Mr T. D. Campbell, President Roosevelt's agricultural adviser, suggesting that the British wheat market should be left exclusively to Canada as a matter of a U.S.-Canadian friendly arrangement—"that would enable Canada to buy more from us." We can get a new group of A.B.C. Powers—America, Britain, Canada. Or shall we say, "A.B.C.—America, British Commonwealth?"

What Canada demands must, within some measure, be conceded both by Great Britain and by the United States. She can command her terms. Britain cannot afford to see the disruption of the Commonwealth. The United States cannot view with equanimity any grave divergence between American and Canadian policy. Canada, in brief, can "sit pretty" granted that Canada will but make

up her mind what she herself wants and what scheme of world order she is prepared to back. Hers is a pivotal position and, that fact being granted and utilized with skill by her statesmen, she can attain an influence quite disproportionate to her position as a secondary Power. To a slightly less degree the same argument applies with Australia.

A policy that sought to guarantee the peace of the world, not only through the League and the British Commonwealth—to both of which Canada is committed but neither of which can be regarded as complete instruments—but also through a Regional Federation including France, the British Commonwealth, and the United States, is, in the words to me of the acting premier of one of the Canadian Provinces, “quite ideal for us.” From the point of view of French Quebec—which is in many ways more Catholic than Francophil—the inclusion not only of France but of Ireland and perhaps of Belgium within this scheme has its merits.

Canada can, moreover, immediately make her influence felt by making clear what kind of projects she would *not* accept—as for instance any scheme that omits the United States but makes Canada co-guarantor of Danubian frontiers within some primarily European scheme. She can also immediately set expert committees to work to study the prospects of a North American Inter-State Commerce Commission.

In the United States the project must be presented in a fashion that takes well into account the isolationist undertow in the sentiment of that country which, temporarily in retreat, is quite capable of

reasserting itself. Indeed the biggest argument for Federal Union is that only by this course, and not by "Genevanism" *alone*—least of all by a strengthened Genevanism—can isolationism be prevented after the war from reacquiring temporary dominance. Further, in presenting Federal Union, we must take into account also the fact that this isolationism is historically not national but hemispheric. The Monroe Doctrine was not just national isolationist doctrine but a scheme for maintaining peace "in at least one hemisphere."

The project must be presented as *primarily and in its most outstanding feature a North American scheme*, although not exclusive of Pan-American schemes. It will make a reality of the union of North America and this voluntarily; and the "three thousand miles of undefended frontier" will in effect cease to be even a frontier. A common citizenship will supervene with reciprocal electoral rights, such as now exist between British residents in Canada and Canadians in Britain. But this is no plan for Canadian annexation. The relations between Ottawa and Westminster must be preserved. There must be common citizenship here also. For the rest, the United States, alone or in the North American Union, will have to attend, in a changing world, to issues that do genuinely affect the defence of North America whether off the St Lawrence or around Hawaii and Alaska, where (although this is habitually forgotten) the United States shares a common frontier with Stalin.

The advantages of the scheme to the United States are so immense that they are perhaps best not elaborated too fully or emphasized too much.

The most obvious objection to the whole scheme is that it means "selling out" the British Commonwealth to the United States. The memories of the evil work of Lord North—overruling Chatham and Burke—and of Lord North's German Hanoverian King and his German Hessian "red coat" troops still persists—although it is more capable of being relegated to the state when "bygones are bygones" than certain vocal gentlemen might admit. As I have always said in America, there have been four Civil Wars in our history: that of Parliamentarian against Cavalier; that of the Whigs and the Glorious Revolution against James II; that of Chatham and the supporters of Democrat Jefferson's Rights of Man against George III; and that of the North against the slave-holding South. And in each case the progressive cause won although, in the Third Civil War, the White House was burned, in 1812, before there was final settlement.

Certainly any criticism to the effect that the Founding of the Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth means selling out the United States to the British Commonwealth is imbecile, since clearly the United States would tend to assume—and, with the present economic drift, would more certainly tend to assume—the hegemony of the whole.

In any plan of full-fledged Union, the United States on a population basis would command the majority, unless much of Europe is brought in. On any scheme of Senate representation by State or Provincial units the United States would still command the majority, and only with an Upper House that, as Streit suggests, gave the U.S.A. 8 votes but each national unit at least 1 vote would

some system of constitutional checks be established. I should, however, add that no such full-fledged scheme is here contemplated for this decade, but something looser and more modest.

As to the military position, even this more modest and traditional project could not go into effect until a late stage of the present war and, therefore, no talk of military obligations or intervention is relevant to this plan, one way or another, so far as the present war is concerned. But, if there *is* military intervention, this project may make it the more worth while in terms of enduring peace for our children. If America militarily intervenes, she will wish to be sure that "the Peace, as well as the War, is Won." I do not, of course, myself believe that the countrymen of Lincoln will be like Meroz in the day of battle against Sisera and the hosts of the mighty. The evidence is to the contrary.

I would go farther and record my belief that it is not in the interest of the American experiment or of representative democracy itself that the fierce ideological struggles that now tear Europe apart should be transferred into America. America will have quite enough trouble in fortifying its own middle-of-the-way liberal democracy and in scotching the Fascist and Communist intrigues which are, at this present day, already very busy and well organized in its midst, preaching a new, allegedly better, but certainly more dictatorial and totalitarian system. As one such Washington lobbyist, whom I had last seen in Moscow, remarked to me, "but there won't then be many parties, only a one-party dictatorship." He concluded by expressing his

detestation of the British Commonwealth and his desire for its fall.

There is one reservation alone in the military and naval position. A German-Russian-Japanese consolidation (*i.e.* a consolidation of three of our World Regions against the fourth) is never likely to be stable. The North Atlantic Region is stronger than any other taken alone. But such a German-Russian-Japanese consolidation cannot be absolutely excluded. One has only to contemplate the present political scene. And, so long as it is or may be integrated, then the United States *cannot militarily afford to be indifferent* to that potential menace to herself. That seems to me to be not a matter of discussion but one of brute fact which few sane men would care to dispute.

In brief, then, one has here a superb opportunity, owing to the flux of the present international situation, to build up a political North America and to consolidate it, and later Pan-American Union, and an English-speaking Union making a buckle with democracy abroad, without war. That indeed would be "peace in one hemisphere," and in more than one hemisphere. (I should like to commemorate the completion of the work by putting up, in Lafayette Square, Washington, opposite the White House, amid all the French, Polish, and German worthies there, a statue of Oliver Cromwell—compensating the Irish by a second statue, of St Patrick—or maybe a statue of Burke or Raleigh.)

In Britain, the project must be presented to a different public and with yet again different emphasis. Here perhaps the most difficult work has to be done.

The public, however, to whom the case would have to be presented would be, more than elsewhere, a public of statesmen, men of affairs, experts. The issues are those of economics, population, strategy, and assured peace.

For some time—indeed since the withdrawal from the Ruhr and since Locarno—it has been clear that France is no longer in a position to stand militarily alone against a consolidation of Central European power. It is not possible on the basis of man-power. The only remedies for France have been either participation in some international organization, such as the League of Nations, making for peace and disarmament and embracing at least all Europe, or security by means of alliances. The rise of Fascist militarism and the rejection of the League has rendered the first course no longer adequate.

The alternative course is basically one of Anglo-French integration, military and economic. Even here military security, although reinforced, still requires, in order to be effective, a certain hinterland of support, beyond France and Great Britain alone. Even assuming Russia neutral, Captain Liddell Hart was of the opinion, in his *Defence of Britain*, that Britain and France together could only follow a defensive policy. Either this hinterland must be found in Europe, in the area of what used to be called the Little Entente, or it must be found in the British Commonwealth and the New World. Military assistance may not always be necessary; but economic assistance, accompanied by 'moral good will, is required.

The policy of looking Westwards for an economic

hinterland has obvious geographic difficulties and some political ones—but none greater than those which confront the British Commonwealth itself. It is economically incomparably preferable to that of relying on some reconstructed Little Entente, which did much to bedevil the impartial and honest working of the League.

The old objections to British Imperial Federation are largely irrelevant to a scheme so much wider, for which the imperialism of Joseph Chamberlain, and even of Cecil Rhodes, is already as dead as the dinosaur. Lord Cecil raised these again from the dead, in his *A Great Experiment*, as objections to Federal Union. These objections, however, so far as they sprang from the Dominions themselves, were partly governed by a nascent nationalism of the nineteenth-century variety, now outmoded in a world where small nations have a short life and not a merry one; and were partly governed by jealousy and suspicion of being entirely dominated again by Great Britain herself. This last objection is obviously irrelevant to the present project.

Moreover, it may be suspected that these objections of the Dominions were looked upon, to say the least, entirely without disfavour, if not actively encouraged, by Liberal British Governments, of the *laissez-faire* school—also nineteenth-century in type—which viewed the project of Federation not only without faith but as an outrage to the Liberal Party credo. These Liberals had not yet grasped the notion of Federalism as a true Mazzinian compromise between internationalism and nationalism, because they, as “atomizers” and individualists, were reluctant to recognize the strength of com-

munity feeling behind nationalism itself. They were led astray by the false, "thin" internationalism. They did not understand their own Liberalism in its full Federal implications and hence gave countenance to what Lowes Dickinson, in a famous book, called *The International Anarchy*. For similar reasons a Liberal lawyer such as Lord Haldane encouraged, by his decisions in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the provincialization and "atomization" of Canada and the undoing of the Federal Constitution—a work the converse of that of John Marshall in the United States.

However, no point is scored here in discussing this out-of-date argument except to show that the defeat of nineteenth-century Imperial Federation does not establish a "No-Thoroughfare" for a totally dissimilar Federal Unionism in the Anglo-Saxon World. It can be said with dogmatic confidence that the objections of the Dominions to a new Imperial Parliament located at Westminster and dominated by Britain provide no ground for supposing objections of the Dominions to a federation with the United States and Britain (after the lesson of war), when the central organ of the federation might be expected to move from capital to capital and to gratify Dominion pride. As for the United States, it can be said with some confidence that the Federal Movement, thanks to the efforts of Mr Streit, Miss Dorothy Thompson, Mr Somerset Maugham, Mr Russell Davenport, Mr Robert Sherwood and others, is far further advanced there than in Britain.

If, however, France has to look to Britain, and the British Islands in turn have to look to the Common-

wealth—not to speak of the Irish of Ireland looking to the other Irishmen—and to the New World for economic hinterland, then Britain and France have got to be prepared to pay the price for their own needs. They have their choice: integration with Central and Middle Eastern Europe, excluding Russia—a Europe of heterogeneous, scattered parts without common tradition (an integration certainly not very easily to be reconciled with retention of the monarchy), or integration with the West into an organization of the Western Powers. This last permits some measure of disarmament and constructs a Power competent to deal with Germany. But they can't have both, in the first instance and in the same degree of intimacy, because the New World won't stand for it. I submit that they should choose the latter, and should maintain the relations of an international world *through the League of Nations, including Russia*.

This is to state the practical dilemma rather too sharply. A scheme, of a wider nature, can be outlined which would probably be acceptable to Canada, to the United States, and to Britain and France. Let us use an illustration and suppose, as Mr Paul van Zeeland supposed in a discussion I had the honour of having with him, a "house of many mansions" or, at least, of many floors.

Let us take as basement or first floor the loose confederate structure of the League of Nations, not juridically interfering with national sovereignty and as near to *universal* in membership as feasible. At least we can assume United States co-operation in the International Labour Office. Germany would be included, and the Danubian and Balkan

federations. Then let us assume a second floor of Federation, economic and administrative, of the British Commonwealth and the French Empire.¹ Beside this we have a floor occupied by the Federation of the United States and the British Commonwealth. Then we add a third floor, involving a confederation at least economic, but also not without administrative implications, of the United States, the British Commonwealth, and France. It is reasonable then to assume that at a later date we can add a top floor for those small nations, Belgium and the rest, that will find it convenient to come under the roof of this great structure. The power of political attraction that would induce them to do so is very strong. We may also have our private belief that these upper storeys will be reconstructed at an early date so as to throw them into far more intimate connection.

This thesis, I believe, would be acceptable in Britain and perhaps France (unless France prefers a Latin Union); and could be there commended with vigour and prospect of success. It involves certain changes of habit of thought and even sacrifices of prestige, but not to any extent that could not be *patriotically commended in the interest of a greater democratic Union*. Here, in Britain, the sacrifice is perhaps the greatest—more than elsewhere—but it is not, I believe, excessive if the goal of peace and of security in the Anglo-Saxon manner of democratic living is thereby permanently achieved.

¹ I do not discuss here the more difficult case of the inclusion of Germany, *vide* p. 62; or whether the inclusion of France is to be held *essential*, granted a vigorous League.

It may, indeed, be that owing to a march of events about which no one can as yet speak with certainty, we shall have temporarily to abandon talk of Anglo-French Union or of any Anglo-European Union and to concentrate our whole attention upon Anglo-Saxon Union, although not to the exclusion of the principle of an "open federation." Broadcasting on the British Broadcasting Company's Home Service, on March 23, 1941, Lord Beaverbrook, member of the War Cabinet, said that he hoped that,

when victory is won, we shall enjoy a union of interest and purpose between the two sundered fragments of the Anglo-Saxon race. Such a mighty concentration of power and influence will subdue the proud and hold in check the wicked, will secure peace in their occupations to men of good will. . . . Perhaps we shall be JOINED TOGETHER AGAIN. How I long for that day. It has been a life work with me and now perhaps crowned with triumph through disaster.

The method that I have here adopted of dealing with the kind of faint-hearted or obstructionist objector who says that the plan, although doubtless acceptable in country A, would have no chance of making headway in country B, is not to be understood as giving any ground for the attack that we have here not one scheme but three schemes. On the contrary we have here not three schemes but one scheme, outlined in the former chapters of this book and here summarized. It is however legitimate to suppose that three different publics, with different angles of approach and climates of opinions, will require to have the scheme presented politically in different fashions.

If I am prepared to accept any charge, it is that,

in discussing the Time Scale, I have presented the plan, in its immediate form, too modestly and too moderately.

* * * *

If anyone will consider the history of the last twenty-five years he will note that the map of the world has been changed by the visionaries, the men of imagination. These, the men of imagination, have been the true political realists. Sometimes the vision has been false, the imagination diseased. These visionaries have, too often, been men of the totalitarian and dictatorial camps. Democracy also requires its visionaries, who will also be the great realistic politicians. It is no good hoping that we can oppose to false vision no vision. We must oppose to false vision true vision—to *destructive* imagination we must oppose *constructive* imagination. We have it in our hands to build a power compared with which Herr Hitler's wildest dream will seem a very paltry affair. It is arguable that it might, with benefit to the Germans, include Germany herself. (I should indeed like it to do so. I would wish for this solution.) Let us rest assured of this, that either we must take our share in the shaping of this New World to come and its New Order by vigorous initiative, or we shall ourselves be passively shaped. Everyone here is in the arena and there are no reserve stalls.

Let us at least be clear that this world integration is a matter requiring heroic statesmanship backed by authority. It may take a Cæsarean form based on Berlin; a Marx-Stalin Communist form based on Moscow; or it may take a Federal form based on Washington and Westminster. But it will not

be produced by nervelessness, or by the pious weak endeavours of a number of small Powers who are too scared of bold action even to advance to the regional stage of fusing sovereignty—because, forsooth, that might lead to so much power that they might do something bad with it. The history of politics is the history of power—used for good or ill. If democracy is to prevail democracy must unite—and unite just there where from cultural and historical agreement, territorial proximity, and common economic standards it best may. *If it cannot unite there, then it will not unite in some loftier, vaguer, sub-lunar sphere.*

I have here spoken on the assumption that the world will be as we wish it to be and that we shall be in a position to mould it as we want it. The wisest campaigner, however, is not the man most optimistic in tactics or who throws away safeguards. The outstanding fact is that AngloSaxony plus France—the United States, Canada, the British Commonwealth, Ireland, Scotland, England, perhaps France, perhaps Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium—is potentially *the greatest power bloc in the world*, such as need fear no rivals. It is pointless to say that “other countries” from jealousy will seek to prevent this union or that they will attack it. Small countries, on the contrary, will hasten at a run to join this open union, for, let us be quite clear, *an open federation* it must be. I cannot imagine anything more dangerous or more contrary to our own three-centuries-old tradition than a new “racialism.” We have what Miss Dorothy Thompson, in her advocacy of Anglo-Saxon Union, calls “a nation of nations and a race of races.” Big countries can

do what they choose with their jealousy. They are jealous already. But to attack it will be to be defeated.

War is the one great abomination equivalent to slavery that remains still with us. On that Horse of the Apocalypse rides the horseman Death. War must be broken, and may be broken by force. The pacifist spirit of mankind will be needed to prevent little politicians reviving it again in the name of the "honour" of the duel between nations and in the name of national sovereignty, which is the lawyers' name for the right to war. There is no such thing as a good war as instrument of national policy. *But to organize peace we require the concentration of power*—not power to suppress Germany but power to build enduring peace. Only by such a concentration of power, indeed, can we afford to give Germany, without undue risk, room economically to export or the freedom of political development indicated in these pages. And without this we shall have war again in 1960. Small Powers have never been and cannot be generous because security, not peace, is their obsession. Only a great concentration of power can be generous. The alternative is that every twenty years mankind continues to pour from the alembic of Hell the broth of war.

Compared with such a concentration of power Adolf Hitler's *Anschluss* of Germany and Austria becomes a paltry and negligible affair. Here we have a far mightier *Anschluss* than Hitler ever dreamed of, although Hitler may under Providence have precipitated it. *For that Anschluss or Union this book is a plea—the Anglo-Saxon Anschluss.* And

should the tide of war turn against us that *Anschluss* of the British Commonwealth, including Canada and Australia, with the United States, is not merely desirable for peace but the grimmest of necessities.

We live in the months of a great *Götterdämmerung*, a "Twilight of the Gods" of Civilization. The lights of heaven are occulted. But, just as out of the one great historic defeat of the Eastern half of the Anglo-Saxon peoples emerged the Independence of the United States, so out of this straitening and stress of gestation may emerge the Anglo-Saxon Re-Union. A patriot policy means, in victory, that the Anglo-Saxon peoples, with those who will join with them, will take a proportionate lead and responsibilities in widespread organization. Let us reiterate with final emphasis, in Mr Winant's words, that "the common ideals of the English-speaking peoples of this world are not ideals from which other peoples of the world are excluded. . . . Our strength comes from diversity and our freedom is born of tolerance—tolerance of other people's origins, other people's religions, and other people's ideas." It is on these bases that we propose to found the Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth. . . . A patriot policy involves a policy of Peace with Liberty through Federal Union behind the League of Nations. In reverses, a patriot policy means, suppressing all sectional interests, the consolidation wherever we may—even were it outside the British Islands—of an area that shall preserve, so far as we may, our own Anglo-Saxon experimental tradition, with its fashion of life in its essential integrity. It means, bluntly, that we must join the United States

—if and as we can. Otherwise we should have to affirm that AngloSaxony would lie chiefly outside Great Britain. This policy will doubtless be opposed by small, official-grooved minds. Given time, they will wither. Such a concentration of world power, that is in our hands to make, is what is meant by Western Federal Union. It rests with us to decide whether, during and after this war, we shall make through cowardice the renunciation of this opportunity. The process of disruption of democracy will proceed, and the great opportunity will not recur. The logic of history does not compel the survival of democracy—indeed its lessons are sombre with records to the contrary. The responsibility for the initiation of *this experiment in War-Abolitionism* over frontiers, over sovereignties, over pride and vested interests in war, lies with the public of peace-loving men, and not least with the public of the United States. The problem is a simple one: *to look for the easiest frontiers to eliminate, and then to eliminate them.*

* * * * *

Those governments that propose to collaborate in this task might well consider making, at some early season, the following Declaration of Federation¹:

¹ This Declaration was drafted by me in June, 1940, after reading Dr Jennings' Constitution, in his *Federation of Western Europe*, which I saw in proof. The reader is also referred to a Declaration drafted by Mr Streit, which I have deliberately not yet read to avoid possibility of plagiarism, but with which he presented me in September, 1940.

(While passing page proofs an advance copy of Mr Clarence Streit's *Union Now with Britain* (Cape) has come into my hands. Even more than before I would wish this present book to be

It having become plain in the course of human events that war, the greatest present scourge of mankind, is only to be checked by the mergence of the sovereignty of each nation in the sovereignty of all and by the pooling of armed forces; and that peace is indicated for the well-being and progress of humanity by the finger of reason and of reason's God;

Wishing, as patriots, that our States may be among the foremost leaders in such an enterprise for the advance of civilization and the common happiness; and desiring to defend, against the menace of military despotism and of a monstrous tyranny over thought, at once the well-being of our communities, the economic security of our people, the liberty of our persons, the right of free speech and assemblage, the integrity of scientific experiment and the dignity of our mental freedom as moral beings with a responsibility

regarded as symbolizing an outstretched hand of British response in a common great movement. I believe, however, that the first practical step must be taken by implementing, by immediate Parliamentary and Congressional action, the very precise Willkie proposal of mutual interchange of citizenship, based on recognition of Common Values and a Common Tradition on which an *open* Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth can be founded. I also believe that the decisive factors for peace will be the technological and strategic ones of (a) common control of raw materials and (b) a centralized air control force. I am aware, of course, that Mr Streit does not stand committed to, and is indeed a critic of, my view of Anglo-Saxondom, as nucleus held together by a cultural tradition but involving economic change. Attention is also called again to the useful and thorough work of the chairman of the directors of Federal Union in Britain, Mr R. W. G. Mackay, entitled *Federal Europe* (1940), as expressing well the theme of what I will call "the Eastern school" of Federal Union.—G. C. May 24, 1941.)

higher than responsibility to any prince or state power;

We, the accredited representatives of the under-mentioned States, speaking for their governments and their peoples and conscious of an obligation to promote the peace through federation of humanity, hereby take the first step thereto by our own solemn federation.

To which end we agree to replace our existing armies, navies and air-forces by a federal force, drawn without discrimination from the citizens of our States and retaining for our respective States solely the right to raise, maintain and direct a state police.

We agree to establish, as shall later be constitutionally determined, a central federal authority, consisting of judiciary, legislature and executive; and to this authority the right to direct defence, to decide foreign policy, to regulate foreign trade and to co-ordinate commerce, industry and labour in interstate relations shall appertain.

We declare that, by this act of federation, we constitute ourselves a new people and that of this our nation we do all equally become citizens, without discrimination or privilege of race, sex, religion, occupation or class, enjoying equal rights in all parts of this federation as federal voters, equality before the law and equality of access to public provisions for health, education and work. To each we guarantee the right to work or decent subsistence, and to education according to capacity; the right to free and impartial justice; the right to be tried by due process of law without delay and freedom from arbitrary arrest; and the right to all freedom

of worship, speech, writing, assemblage and political combination that shall be of peaceable intent and manner. Concurrent with these rights we declare that there is a duty of good citizenship of the world and of this federation; of the disciplined and heroic defence of liberty as the warrant of reasonable and vital progress; and of personal labour service without distinction of class in enterprises for the common good as the law may direct.

We declare this Federal Union to be constituted for the better establishment in the world of a reasonable peace, law, liberty and democracy, instead of an intolerable state of war, anarchy and arbitrary rule. We, therefore, further declare that the Federal executive shall be charged to take measures, if needful by force, to prevent the setting up in any member State of any government not duly elected and regularly renewed by a majority or largest electoral portion of the voters or that denies the right of free discussion, constitutional liberty, free combination and secret ballot vote to other parties than its own. Any such government shall be deemed contrary to the Federal Constitution. No election by acclamation or from lists prepared by one party only shall be lawful whether in State or Federal elections.

We declare that henceforth our prime loyalty is to this our federated nation thus sovereignly constituted; and that to it all officers and soldiers of the federal armed forces owe allegiance; that federal law shall override domestic law save as otherwise provided by the constitution of this Union, which constitution may be amended by a two-thirds

majority in both Houses of the Federal Legislature and by majority in the popular legislatures of three-fourths of the States; and that suits between States or between citizens on matters within the province of the federal jurisdiction shall be decided in the federal courts hereinafter to be constituted. It shall be treasonable to use armed force or to incite to the actual use of armed force against the Federal Union.

As token of the amity in which it is our firm purpose to live, we declare the abolition of all frontiers between our States, save so far as may be required for the federal regulation of interstate trade until such time as free trade may be established, or for the detection of criminals, or for the control of migration under federal law. In further sign of which amity, and in gratitude to those our predecessors, lovers of peace and liberty, who have made this union possible, we make this general Declaration of Federation, precedent to the establishment of a Constitutional Commission, and to it set our hands and seals.



